'Fiscal Cliff' Crisis Is A Game Of Identity Politics

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While the Mayan prophecy may have not been fulfilled, at the stroke of midnight tonight- an event might just come close to such  insatiable wrath.

A failure to strike a deal on Fiscal Policy in the United States (going 'over' the cliff) has been characterised as an event with horrific consequences. Cuts in welfare and social security, potential rise in taxes for middle-class families- even the prospect of tipping back into recession (this time, about 100 times worse than 2008-9) have worked to conjure up images of filth, degradation and of course, the inevitable decline of civilisation. 'What happens if I starve because all the stores are closed?', 'How am I going to get to work in the morning?' , 'What if the fiscal cliff sends us to oblivion, where we become savages and throw poop at each other?'- These are just a sample of the reactions concerning the crisis.

The most interesting part of the  negotiations is that these  aren't simply economic questions, but rather, a kind of like a hangover of the 2012 election- essentially,  an exercise of identity politics. 

The current negotiations are basically playing out, as Professor Ian Robertson says here, a bit like a game theory model. Looking at it this way, the negotiations, there is an acknowledgement that both Republicans (R) and Democrats (D) have mutual interests- in this case, not going into recession, not upsetting the markets (great job, guys), not losing the credit rating, and not raising taxes on that all-important middle class.  But while there are mutual interests, the main difference lies in the Bush Tax Cuts. (D) wishes to extend some of the tax cuts, mainly on middle-income earners, (R) wishes to extend all of them.  You can see, in Jacob Geller's play-off matrix, (which has quite a good value-system) that a deal is likely to be brokered, with (D) gaining slightly more leverage than (R). But, this model assumes that the mutual interest being brokered is one that avoids the cliff- in essence, that in understanding the choices within the matrix, you have to account for the wider values of the collective goal of stability.

So, what if Professor Robertson's third point- about the psychological tendency for Schadenfreude, is the most prevalent component of the negotiations? In this case, would either Obama or the GOP prefer 'going over the cliff'?'. This posits a different type of matrix- one in which long-term political advantage plays a more important role than a mutual aim to balance the economy. Indeed, if safeguarding the economy was the priority to either party, then the bill signed in 2010 mandating the deficit reduction probably wouldn't have passed so hastily anyway. Political advantage is obviously much harder to quantify, but I would guess that in the post-election climate, the GOP will probably bear much more of the blame for negative externalities as shown here.  Obama and Biden are unlikely to budge on their position, probably due to a perceived post election mandate,  and their own comprimises relating to entitlements and the Bush tax cuts. Republicans might think they can repeat 2010-11 mid-term action, where they could hold the administration hostage until tax cuts would be accepted, but a stronger and more resilient Obama is probably going to be more confrontational. I haven't attempted to quantify this particular scenario, but my guess would be that even in this situation, the GOP would lose more by refusing to budge from their position. Further, they would be hurt significantly more in the the 2014 mid-terms by refusing to compromise on tax, social security and entitlements than Obama or the Democrats would from maintaining their position.

From what I can see at the moment, a deal is likely to be struct around the 11th hour. That's because the fiscal cliff is really much more about the GOP trying to reassert a political identity after it's defeat earlier this year. Even in this case, the GOP finds itself damaged by the ideological positions it took since 2008- bolstering in tea-party social conservatives, letting notions of the 'small state' overshadow wider ideas of the 'just' state, as well as marginalising the minority groups of which their ideal cuts would impact the most. Boenher knows this too, which is why he'll probably be inclined to allow the tax rises on the richest 10% as well as significant cuts to the defence industry. Unfortunately, the GOP misappropriated the political mood of the nation, sticking to the same ideological positions that lost them the election. What the speaker should realise, is that folding right now, might help his party's long road to recovery come 2016. 

Laws Alone Won't Curb India's Rape Culture

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After the brutal gang-rape of an Indian female student in Delhi, marking the 637th recorded case this year, India has been forced to confront the darkest elements of it's cultural history. Though little information that has been released, women across the subcontinent have organised in protest against an inherently misogynistic culture that has seemingly legitimised such actions, at the expense of their dignity. As more women have spoken out of their own experiences in the past few days, many of the protesters have encouraged the end of a passive culture of acceptance, in which females are systemically degraded and reduced as human beings.

Such horrific events might be viewed as uncharacteristic, particularly in a modernising metropolis, notorious for eulogising notions of love. Indeed, India's long-concealed history of gang-rape and molestation provides no better a juxtaposition to the bastions of romance exhibited by the Taj Mahal or the booming Bollywood industry. Yet, behind these romantic fantasies, exists over a century of culturally-induced sexual repression, affecting the most vulnerable in Indian society. Indeed, as the writer Arundhati Roy has noted, India's toxic rape culture does not simply expose the crudest forms of sexism, but, in turn, also reveals the cynical corruption of the apathetic political class.

Accusations of an institutionalised 'rape culture' is not novel. One only has to look at the unreformed 1860 penal code that views rape as an 'outraging' of a woman's modesty, an association that immediately affiliates the female body merely as a constituent within a masculine-dominated cultural system. Additionally, the law professor Upendra Baxi noted in 2002, that the legal and political systems of India limited the abilities of females to report sexual violence, and in turn reflected a political system in which collective sexual assaults on women could go unpunished. Baxi also highlighted that police authorities often neglected, if not participated in, the phenomenon of 'eve-teasing' - a crude form of sexual molestation that has more than quadrupled over the past decade. Indeed, despite the rapid economic prosperity India has enjoyed since it's independence, little has been achieved to in terms of effective protections for females.

Prime Minister Singh must realise that attempts to codify greater legal protections will benefit only a minority of women, most of whom are concentrated in affluent, urban environments with means to afford security. Despite the basic protections in place, there have been countless occasions where police officers have been accused of actively endorsing such activities.

Officers in New Delhi alone have stated on record, that "male agression is a natural instinct of sexual attraction" and possibly more mortifying, that young girls who share telephone numbers and dances with young boys, indicate legitimate consent. If law enforcement cannot understand the distinction between rape and consensual sex, or even empathise with the vulnerability of young females, then even the most intricate of legal systems will have little effect on rapists and molesters.

What must be realised, is that India should be proactive in challenging certain elements of traditional culture, if it truly wishes to succeed in securing the rights and liberties of its females. One of the most powerful messages held by a young protester this week read: "We live in a society that teaches women not to get raped, instead of teaching men not to rape". Simple as it may be, this statement truly reaches at the crux of this problem.

For the true injustice lies in how women are still recieved in Indian society. Despite phenomenal acheivements in education, professional and public life, women still find themselves devalued within archaic, patriarchal communities where family units unconditionally adore their sons.

Certainly, the denigration of females is often articulated in terms of sexuality, whereby the functions of females are seen merely in bearing and raising children. Further, the lack of sex education in public schools, combined with the staples of brutish masculinity and the fragile damsel within Bollywood cinema, are fundamental in defining gender relationships between males and females. Indeed, such misappropriated fantasies contribute significantly to both the devaluation of sexual relations, as well as fueling an insidious culture of victim-blame.

In justifying their actions, the rapists argued that it was necessary to punish the victim for deviating against societal expectations. In taking lessons from this, Indian autorities should realise that rape is a culturally imbedded problem. To truly defeat it, they must first work to reform the cultural dynamics of society itself.

Does faith have a role in the legal process?

I came across this  interesting article this morning. Legal philosophy is something I've been interested in for a while, as well as something that still tempts me to apply for graduate jobs at Law firms (an exercise that has thus far failed horrifically).

The article, written by the barrister Fatim Jumabhoy, looks at a specific case between two parties and a specific arbitration clause within a mutually consented contract. The legal problem alluded to, is one whereby a previously disregarded arbitration clause between the parties becomes a focal point within legal practice, and more importantly, questions relating to the relationship between individual parties and legal counsel; In this case, whether the parties have the legitimate right to discriminate against their arbiter on the grounds of religious conviction.

I'm not a lawyer, or a law student- so this blog post won't contain footnotes of specific cases, or an in-depth knowledge on the mechanics of legal practice (on a side note, I'm too broke to afford temporary access to law journals online...), so the basis of my thoughts are situated more on philosophical notions- ie. the nature of individual or communal recognition and it's  relationship with courts of law operating within democratic civil society.

Arbitration is a form of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) whereby a matter settled outside of court may take place through mediation with a specific arbiter. Arbitration is also a popular method of resolving disputes; for business, it is often faster than processes of litigation, as well as considerably more cheap. Complex matters can also be conducted much more easily, as parties themselves have a great deal more control over the process than within a court hearing.

One of the complexities in Jivraj v. Hashwani [2010] therefore lies in the acknowledgement of cultural preferences- ie. In desiring that the proceedings are undertaken by counsel with significant knowledge of their cultural community, an arbitration process conducted by 'specialists' is desirable.

Yet, I feel that a more profound legalistic problem also exists at this point, relating more significantly to the relationship between courts of law and complex multicultural society- one in which dominant theories of justice do not have the capacity to accommodate minority cultures with abstracted legal systems. Jumabhoy notes that the original agreement between the two parties stipulated that   :

"any disputes arising from their joint venture agreement should be subject to arbitration, and that the arbitrators should be ‘respected members of the Ismaili community and holders of high office within the community". 

Such a request is of course indicative that in the study of the  nature of individual rights, ownership, property etc. were to be  acknowledged by the arbiter within a specific system of assumed cultural relationships, distant from assertions of the common law system. In turn, the need for an Ismaili arbiter lay specifically in assuring that the both party's assertions of justice were met. This of course, raises a number of problems immediately. First, is the problem of secular courts recognising or indeed accommodating cultural demands deemed irregular- indeed, the Ismaili arbiter may have been able to recognise the cultural identities of each party in a way that a non-Ismaili representatives could not. For both modes of justice to work in conjunction, recognition and reconciliation of different notions of rights must be acknowledged. Second, lies more within the discourse between secular and faith-based forms of justice. In requesting an arbiter from a 'high position within the community' the Ismaili system of justice assumes that specific individuals with different qualifications (ie. a degree from a Hawza as opposed to certification from the English Law Society) assume just as much authority as representatives within secular courts. While an agreed consensus might be easy to reach within this specific case, when one extrapolates this idea to cases of marriage, divorce and family issues, assumed ideas of individual rights between both systems may be difficult to articulate. Indeed, as Ayelet Shachar has noted, many civil rights and Muslim feminist groups have argued that such assumptions often lead to significant disadvantages for women, minority groups and marginalised individuals.


The second problem highlighted in this case relates to the relationship between law and civil society, particularly in multicultural states. A popular notion is that the law operates as a binding framework that works govern society, setting out rules, rights and principles that are objective, and therefore beyond ethnic, cultural and religious contentions.  Indeed, one of the key conflicts in the High Court on this case, was a consideration of the role of the Arbiter being subject to specific employment legislation. While understanding the importance of independence in arbitration, the court noted that religious or national discrimination may be allowed if there was demonstration of a sufficient need. Thus, they ruled that in operating within a specific religious ethos, Jivraj did have a legitimate claim to the necessity of an Ismaili arbiter.

While the ruling was widely supported within the city, future problems have certainly been anticipated. In my opinion, the main problem lies in the balance in the distribution of fair justice, as well as the capacity for law to recognise and accommodate a vicarious range of traditional communities within the UK. For the latter, such acknowledgement comes at the price of questioning what claims for discrimination are legitimate (for example, whether it may be justified to rule out ethnic, sexual or gender groups) , and indeed, maintaining the universal rights held in the  EU Charter. In addition, I think there are some more interesting philosophical problems relating to Law as a consumer good- for example, in choosing forms of dispute resolution that take place outside the court, should parties have more ownership of the legal process? Does such ownership limit the realisation of the fairest possible outcome?

Overall, while I'd be inclined to agree with the court's decision, I expect a lot of these questions to emerge in the future, both within the courts of law and in Parliament.

My issue with Christmas (Or why Scrooge was right)

 

I've never been a huge fan of Christmas. Beyond the  dissolved religious value of the holiday (and if we were actually celebrating it, we'd be celebrating sometime in January, after a month of fasting), something about the holiday period still makes me despair for humanity.  Perhaps it's those last minute shoppers, barging through crowds of pedestrians to reach the zenith of Marks & Spencer to get the last coffee-maker on the shelf, which will only be used twice before its relegation to the storage cabinet. Or, it might be the ever elusive, abstract construction of the 'Christmas Spirit', a weird exertion of Marx's 'opiate' that  encourages a temporary therapy from material problems, through engaging with a material individualism. Certainly, it's genius is not in the resultant amnesia that the tyrannical spirit bequeaths on those that accept it, but how it has been constructed, branded and utilised within common discourse to encourage irrational purchasing.

Many people have commented on my reservations for Christmas, and I've had my fair amount of 'Scrooge!' accusations- or (more novel, I think) , 'Oh it's because you're Muslim, innit'. Much of this probably has to do with an acknowledgement that these types of national holidays should be exempt from post-modern tendencies of deconstruction; Probably the best modern example could be seen in those who criticised the celebration of the Queen's jubilee, or even the Royal wedding, only to find themselves marginalised by a collective sense of apathy. In other words, 'shut up and enjoy the company' seems to be the dominant mantra of stoical, modern, secular Britain today.

The second contention, is that the Christmas of the 'post-modern' undergoes a foundational transition along the same lines as society; ie. that the Christmas of a 'Godless' society transitions from one of ecclesiastical worship to tendencies more altruistic and communal. Christmas is about 'giving', 'sharing' and 'caring' and whatever other type of utopian verb one can conjure up from a seasonal advertisement from Sainsburys. But it is within this particular form of political economy, that allows the 'Christmas spirit' truly to truly thrive, constructing a temporary reality whereby the assumed individualist tendencies of society are forgotten. In this sense, the 'spirit' does not create, but rather induces an unreachable possibility of a world devoid of destructive selfishness.

There is of course, a peculiar irony behind such messages. In the past few years, collective social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, have helped to spark debates on the social role of corporations within the wider economy- particularly in terms of wages, labour rights and the nature of production. Furthermore, the movements have opened up wider concerns relating to social dependence on mass consumption, whereby products might be seen through the lens of Baudrillard; - situated within discursive systems of meaning and identity, and in so doing work to define social value.

The dark side of the 'post-modern' construction of Christmas therefore seems to lie within the flux of this transition. On the one hand, the holiday has been liberated from its religious monopoly, in turn signifying the the substantial power shift between Church and society over the past couple of decades. Yet, this has not necessarily created the reciprocal communality that non-religious advocates of Christmas have tend believe in. Rather, I'd argue that different relationships between advertisers and consumers have been forged, constituting more personalised contracts. In this case, consumers who purchase particular products also buy into the necessary altruist actions- ones which are required to fill those gaping emotional holes eclectically illustrated in seminal Christmas ads.

To me, Christmas posits an alternate realm in which the tyrannical Christmas spirit presents itself as  "emotional consumerism with a human face", by which I mean the actual act of purchasing and giving give products meaning themselves. If we consider that this manipulation is the inevitable product of the relationship between advertising companies and corporations, then altruistic meanings are not simply attributed to products, but also define the processes of exchange and communal gathering. Indeed, as a notorious advertisement suggests, "This is not just Christmas, this is an M&S Christmas".

Sadly, Humiliation Is An Intrinsic Part of Media Culture

This article was published in the Huffington Post on 12/11/2012. The link can be found at : http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hussein-kesvani/sadly-humiliation-is-an-i_b_2277550.html

As the two Australian DJ's responsible for the 'Royal Baby Hoax' were interviewed on television last night, their composure could not have been any further from the charismatic radio presenters they had been a few days ago. Dishevelled, insecure and broken, both Mel Grieg and Michael Christian appeared tearfully remorseful in their desperate attempt to seek redemption. Yet, the DJ's were not just seeking forgiveness from the bereaved family of Jacintha Saldanha. They also appealed for clemency from the wider media culture that in the past few days has transformed them into villains.

There is however, a peculiar irony that lies behind such characterisations. For while the actions of Grieg and Christian were certainly deplorable, they are also far from uncommon in the modern media industry. Nor is the exploitation of humilation and shame something novel to to the culture of entertainment. Indeed, it is often the case that even our most beloved sources of popular entertainment thrive on such vindications, and worse- our society has often been too complacent in allowing this to take place.

This is clearly demonstrated in what has become a staple of British prime-time television, The X Factor, which aired it's 2012 series finale last weekend. While positioning itself as a champion of meritocracy, it routinely juxtaposes two different narratives, and in so doing creates a peculiar pantomime-like spectacle; contrasting a 'rags to riches' theatrical tale of the victors ascendance to fame, while intermitently broadcasting a series of purposefully cringe-inducing and less than melodic renditions of well-known pop songs.. Though maintaining the popularity of the franchise, such a dichotomy inevitably results in a cynical dehumanisation of the latter category of contestants, who find themselves rendered as objects designed solely for entertainment pleasure. They are designed for the purpose of humiliation, which in itself contributes to the overall success of the show.

Even when this structure changes, perhaps most evident through the 2009 runner-up Susan Boyle, this mentality resonates. In this case, it was not Ms.Boyle's vocal talents which amazed viewers, but rather the idea that she was devoid of all the aesthetic qualities viewers had come to expect. Ms.Boyle was not simply a contestant- she was also an object who's oddity attracted higher viewer ratings.

Further, one only has to look at the recent controversy surrounding a Brazillian prank show that used terrifying practical jokes to humiliate unknowing people using an elevator, or indeed it's milder and more popular counterpart, the MTV hit show 'Punk'd'. Both programmes use staged practical jokes as a means to trick their victims, of which are then broadcast for viewers to enjoy. But in doing so, this type of progamming continues the process of dehumanising and objectifying their victims, ultimately rendering them helpless to forces that exploit their shame.What is often forgotten in cases such as Ms. Saldanha's, particularly by consumers of these forms of media, is the intensity of the trauma that comes afterword- the embrassment as well as the personal convictions of inadequacy. Indeed, it is easy to forget that outside the pantomime world that these practical jokes take place in, are the victims who have involuntarily become sacrificed to satisfy an almost fetishised addiction for public humiliation.

What has created this misanthropic media culture? Some have blamed a cosmopolitan notion of individualism that has replaced empathy with apathy. Others lay blame on the infatuation with celebrity- one where consumers take pleasure in seeing the inadequacies and imperfections of public figures exposed.

However, it is perhaps the case that the actions of Grieg and Christian simply reflect the way in which popular entertainment has transformed, particularly in the wake of new technology and the

methods by which consumers can participate with modern media. Where it is designed to inform and entertain, media culture naturally orientates toward the wants of prospective audiences, providing them with the cheap thrills, raunchy stories and public shaming needed for a brief moment of escapsim. Whether in reality television, soap operas or the pages of gossip magazines, such stories appeal to us simply because it feeds into a fantasy world peculiarly relatable to us.

While Grieg and Christian to hold some responsibility to the tragic death of Ms.Saldanha, we should not be apathetic to the culture which allowed such humiliation to take place. In particular, it should be understood that beyond the fictional worlds created by popular media are those victims, like Ms. Saldanha and many others, who have the same insecurities and vulnerabilities as the audience that observes them. If there is anything that we can learn from Ms. Saldanha's case, it is surely that they deserve the right to retain their dignity too.

The Autumn Statement Does Not Address The Inequality Problem

 Photo from : Kevin Coombs/Reuters via guardian.co.uk

In closing his Autumn Statement, chancellor George Osborne left the British public with three things. First, that in contrast to his self-assured prophecy, it would be unlikely that he would be able to achieve the goal of reducing national debt as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP). Second, that the 'era of austerity' would not cease until 2017-18, substantially undermining the credibility of his fiscal rules. Third, however, was the point that the chancellor didn't make explicit- that in attempting to orientate economic policy to the political development of a 'smaller state' the present condition of the economy has failed to ignite desperately needed economic growth.

It is therefore rather puzzling, that the chancellor continues to play politics with the economy. Despite of all the common rhetoric we have come to expect from the chancellor, particularly in his cynical attacks against the labour party, what has been glossed over is how marginalised groups are rendered the most vulnerable in Osborne's economic plans. Researchers at the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have shown that a real-term cut in welfare will do little to help the estimated 6.1 million people living in poverty in working households. The chancellor (and probably some Lib Dems) might try counter this through the £235 increase in personal allowance tax, but while this might benefit some low-income earners, it is likely to inflict a great deal of damage to low income working families on means-tested benefits. Indeed, it seems peculiar that those at the recieving end of Osborne's failing economic strategy- those rule-abiding, aspirational families, are the ones who will receive the most punishment for the years ahead.

Contrast this with the much lobbied for action to reduce corporate rates of tax to just 21% in 2014, a two percent decrease. This is not only indicative of a continuing ideological position whereby tax relief will automatically stimulate job creation, but it also illustrates the chancellor's disregard of how important small and medium sized enterprises are to recovery. In particular, the statement said little in relation to the apparent funds available at the planned Business Bank, or how prospective entrepeneurs can gain easier access to equitable sums of capital. And indeed, while a a levy is still in place for large banks, the OBR has estimated that HM revenue is likely to collect £2.5 billion per annum, less than half a percent greater than under the last government. All of this shows the chancellor's personal conviction of his strategy- one in which the approval of the markets and the AAA rating are retained, and where large corporations are the saviours of the economy, at the expense of under-capitalised small-medium enterprises.

Ultimately, the failures shown by the autumn statement do little to alieviate both intrinsic economic problems, as well as the wider social issues that come from it. In fact, this may indeed be one of the central problems faced by the chancellor. In attempting to maintain the nation's reputation on the markets, the chancellor has opted for an approach designed to keep the status-quo in place. The price of such an approach is retaining the inherent societal inequality that comes with it- one in which the most wealthy contribute much less as a share of income compared to the most vulnerable, of whom face further risks of cuts to welfare and public services.

Thus, the chancellor should take away two lessons from his statement. First, that in breaking both his fiscal rules, a rethink of his deficit reduction strategy needs to focus more on long-term job creation. This might require significantly more investment into infrastructure projects. Second, and probably more important, is an acknowledgement that the condition of the economy directly relates to the nature of society itself. It is futile to believe that sustainable, long term growth can be achieved without confronting inequality, not just through monetary approaches, but also in providing the opportunities necessary for young people to flourish. 

Same Sex Couples Will Not Benefit From Marriage In Churches : (Personal View)

                     

When I first started this blog- as a means of overstating my somewhat miniscule relevance in both student journalism and indeed, 'opinions' in general, I never intended to look at things which had overtly emotional overtones. Yet, when hearing today that David Cameron has given the green light for same-sex marriages to be carried out in religious institutions (although, I expect this is mainly focused on the Church of England), a few things really surprised me. In particular, I think that this political posturing shouldn't be celebrated, or entertained.

First things first, the boring stuff; The Prime Minister (and probably the rest of the cabinet, including what might be an agitated Theresa May) has really only voiced his opinion and subsequently will be proposing the bill in Parliament. Whether or not the bill will actually go through, I don't know. (I expect it will likely pass, albeit with many abstentions and Tory rebellions). However, this blogpost isn't about the inner workings of the British parliament, or the complications such a bill must go through to be passed. It's also not about the European Court of Human Rights enforcing the principle in law.

Yet, you might wonder why, as a self-claimed 'wooly liberal', particularly one that believes in the benefits of a pluralistic society, why I am not rushing to my twitter feed to praise David Cameron (or berate some homophobes). Rest assured, it's not because I've suddenly become an orthodox Muslim, nor homophobic.

In fact,  I'd suggest that the realities of actualising such a bill stray far beyond the amiable intentions of the Prime Minister, and is more likely to further disenfranchise same-sex couples, particularly in their relationship with religious institutions.

Much of this has to do with the structure of the proposal itself. Cameron has already said that same-sex marriage ceremonies will be based on an opt-in policy, which in my eyes is hardly revolutionary, nor indicative of the great reform. This point is particularly crucial if we are to look at an institution such as the Church of England (CofE), which serves not only as a figurehead of Christianity, but also as a vital part of political and civic culture. Yet, with the CofE being rather vocal in opposing the proposal, it seems unlikely that many churches will 'opt-in' to proposals of administering ceremonies. True, other churches will take an opposite view- some Anglican, Protestant and Quaker churches have come out in favour. But this does not remove the fact that same-sex couples are likely to occupy the same social position within civil society itself. The CofE is not only a religious force, but also one that wields a great deal of cultural influence; with a reaction to what might be seen as government intervention in sacred institutions, it's not unlikely that the CofE will reassert the sanctity of it's traditional practices through further hostility to homosexual couples seeking to be married in the Church. Indeed, this might also be worse for religious institutions that fall outside the political structures of the country- namely in Mosques and Synagogues, where an extremely stringent definition of marriage is in place.

More vital in this debate, is the way in which 'marriage' is actually conceptualised in the first place. Many who support the idea of equal marriage do so under the premise that the existing status-quo distinguishes between 'civil unions' and 'marriages' and as such devalue the former over the latter. While civil unions are legitimised by the state, the argument goes that the term 'marriage' denotes something much more profound and removed from legalistic connotations. On this basis, it is argued that marriage should be extended on the grounds that it provides the same legitimacy to all forms of relationships.  However, it might just be this assertion that proves the biggest obstacle of achieving recognition of equal partnerships.

If there is one thing that unifies both the 'for' and 'against' camps in relation to same sex marriage, it is that a fundamental component of 'marriage' is one founded on love and commitment.  But why must such an acknowledgement necessarily derive from those that run religious institutions? Particularly those who not only oppose the union itself, but find the very entity threatening to it's definition of marriage as an institution? Desirable as it might be, I feel that same-sex couples will sadly be unable to reconcile such differences in the long-run.

In this case, I think that there are two options same-sex couples (and indeed, others as well) should lobby for. First, is the libertarian idea of removing the concept of 'marriage' from the privileged monopoly status of the state. While this would mean that Churches and other religious institutions may have the freedom not to wed same-sex couples, it would also open up a market for other groups to carry out ceremonies using the term 'married'. While this approach might create a more level playing field, couples will still face problems within society, particularly in the way that some religious institutions may claim greater authority to marriage than others. In this case, a second approach might be more desirable- one whereby the concept of 'civil partnerships' becomes 'state-recognised marriage'. In this case, while all couples could legally be 'married' with the acknowledgement of the state, it would come at the cost of souring relations with a more aggravated, and possibly more hostile church. Possibly, there might be a third option; while it's certainly clear that governments can do little in terms of forcing religious institutions to host same-sex marriages, history has shown that the Church has always reformed when continual pressure is placed on it's relevance and legitimacy. While the road is arduous, equal marriage activists might find that a true long-term change may only come from further direct challenges to the church itself.

Redesigning Intervention : Why the west should not be afraid of intervention

  

These days, the word 'intervention' occupies one of the darkest realms of our conciousness, particularly in relation to the Middle East. Indeed, it's tainted legacy in both Iraq and Afghanistan has reduced intervention either as an action destined to fail, or worse, an ugly form of pseudo-imperialism, designed ultimately to reassert brutal hegemonic structures of power. In our age, a much darker future can also be seen as one repetitive of the late 1980s, whereby intervention through the means of directly arming rebel groups, may in turn give rise to hard line, militant Islamists. As we have been warned- by both Arab and Western media outlets, walking down the road of military intervention, in whatever capacity, is too dangerous to bear the risks.

Despite such fears, I feel that the way in which we conceptualise 'intervention' is heavily misconstrued, in such a way that we immediately associate the notion with the darkest parts of recent history. Yet, on the current stage of international diplomacy, the Western world finds itself in a precarious poisition, whereby they must reconcile the rights of sovereignty whilst maintaining an ethos for universal human rights and liberties. In the case of Syria, this does not simply relate to the toppling of the Assad regime, or the removal of the ruling family. Indeed, while arming the rebels, or a direct NATO intervention may be successful in removing Assad, what will soon be found is that the lack of any coherent oppositional force to allow a transfer of governance will provide the capacity for rampant civil war. And while I certainly agree that direct military intervention, particularly on a ground level, is likely to provide further impetus for perpetuating such tensions, the philosophical basis on which the western world conducts its diplomacy should not be forsaken out of ease or fear.

The West, and in particular the United States, should therefore be proactive in forging the conditions to which Syrian society can not only resolve the violence, but also witness the political change so many have died for. In this case, the West should be more strategic in it's non-military attacks; As Michael Ignatieff wrote in the Financial Times earlier this year, a comprehensive 'quarantine' of Syria by the international community, that would reduce Assad to a perennial outsider on the global stage. Furthermore, sanctions on commerce that hit the Syrian elite, oddly aloof to the conflict, would also be substantial in weakening the foundations of Assad's regime. Finally, however, is that if intervention does take place, it must do so in a way that is devoid of political posturing; in this case, the West should not be afraid to work with the likes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey as well as the recently established key player, Mr. Mursi of Egypt. By a proactive engagement in multilateral diplomacy within the region, the West can not only help to remove the neo-imperialist stigma of the past, but they may also find success in moulding a new model of humanitarian intervention removed of romantic politics.

Ultimately, our age now requires a different understanding of what 'interventionism' actually is. Indeed, while still maintaining the amiable goals of securing individual rights and security, the West should also consider reconstructing the means to secure these aims through more targeting, non-military approaches, as well as working with key players within the region to ensure that these principles are placed at the forefront of humanitarian ambitions. Not only would such an approach be the most likely to curb a prospective surge in civil violence once Assad's palace collapses, but it would also do well in repairing relations between the West and the Arab world.

Demo 2012 : Marching In The Wrong Direction

   This was originally published online, by my university newspaper, Nouse.

                                  

As students unions across the country prepare to march on London this Wednesday, they will do so under the new slogan devised by the National Union of Students (NUS) – “Educate, Employ, Empower”.
In the hope that this protest will recapture the energy of the student movement after its speedy demise in 2010, the NUS has thus far attempted to limit the possibilities of violence through framing the protests around attaining a ‘fair deal’ for students. As articulately put by YUSU president Kallum Taylor, “Whatever your politics are, it doesn’t matter. All students want value for money”. Yet, rather than a means of empowerment, such aims may instead further weaken both the credibility of the NUS, and the wider student movement itself.

There are two main reasons why, despite a high turnout of student activists, Wednesday’s protest is unlikely to realise its objectives. First relates to the increasing politicisation of NUS, whereby since 2010, the organisation has done little in terms of developing a coherent structure to which it can effectively organise students. Instead, the focus on the betrayal of the Liberal Democrats and the Coalition Government has reduced the organisation’s public image to one that loudly blames others for its tribulations, while simultaneously churning out student politicians and union leaders. Such characterisations are not completely misconstrued – indeed, under the presidency of Aaron Porter, the NUS became much more concerned with political polemics relating to student fees, than on the state of wider student representation. In looking at the first major event of Liam Burns’ presidency, it sadly seems likely that there will be further political positioning within the union.

More important, however, is that an NUS devoid of a progressive direction for the student movement has found itself confined to debating the issue on the Government’s terms. For the NUS, Wednesday’s protest will aim to set out clear demands for a fair and equitable ‘deal’ for students, which will provide them with the end product of paid employment. Additionally, various student unions, including YUSU, have aligned themselves to similar sentiments. Certainly, this is a far cry from 2010, where students collectively argued (both through on campus occupations and the NUS demo) that any attempt to increase the financial cost of education would not only damage the student, but would also risk the integrity of educational institutions themselves. Ultimately, the nature of the debate has shifted, from a discussion on the wider social value of British higher education institutes, to one reduced to how students can maximise their benefit from the costs of university.

The NUS seems to have abandoned efforts to argue the importance of universities in relation to wider social democracy, and has instead accepted the government’s increasing rhetoric, that the institutions of higher education should simply be extensions of a consumer society.
Although Wednesday’s demo will show the vivacity and energy of the national student body, it seems unlikely that it will be concentrated into a clear and coherent oppositional narrative to the government. Indeed, despite the amiable goals of both student unions and the NUS, the demo seems little more than continued political posturing, ultimately designed as an attempt to reassert the credibility of the NUS as a valuable organisation.

Rewriting History

When the poet Benjamin Zephaniah recently stated that Black and Asian students in the UK are only told ‘half the story’ in the study of history, he inadvertently contributed to the long-standing debate that has lingered not only in the ivory towers, but also at the heart of society. Having famously turned down his OBE on the basis that “Empire evokes slavery, brutality, and oppression” and holding republican views have been referred to in the past as ‘Anti-British’, Zephaniah’s comments should be welcomed in that they illuminate some of the most pressing challenges of our generation – particularly relating to identity, citizenship and the role of public institutions today.

Such comments provide an opportunity to understand how history operates. Though Zephaniah’s argument is by no means novel, it does contribute to a much wider debate on how Europe should deal with it’s imperial past, particularly within multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies. Should the history of Empire be premised on negative notions of guilt and salvation, or exude a forceful triumphalism? Indeed, the former has been characterised through a wealth of post-colonial literature, particularly from scholars such as Catherine Hall and Edward Said, whose work illustrates the subjugation of colonial subjects by European Imperial structures in ways that are almost alien to students of History today. 

 Conversely, latter polemics of Empire, probably best asserted through Niall Ferguson, construct an image of ‘Imperium’ as a revolutionary force, while being somewhat apathetic towards illuminating the tribulations of it’s victims. The conflicts of ideology evident in post-colonial scholarship provide an extremely difficult environment for our public education institutions, particularly those providing secondary education, to teach things like the history of Empire. 

Yet, rather than scholarship itself, the structure of history teaching at public institutions may perpetuate the problems Zephaniah speaks of. Most students who studied history as a GCSE or A level subject are likely to agree that their experience of the subject remained somewhat confined to specific periods, with a practice reduced to approved textbooks. 

Indeed, students who have gone on to study History in university will note how academic research methods vastly contrast with the neatly boxed narratives of the curriculum-based system. Indeed, one could argue that the latter actively encourages historical events to be both generalised and arbitrarily defined to meet the approved standard of Education bureaucrats. This is not to say that history teaching formulates within an ideological paraxis, but rather that a restraining cirricula provides little capacity for critical thought against historical generalisations. 

 

Further, the comments also address a root problem in historical scholarship that many – not least, Niall Ferguson – have warned about; the dialogue between universities and public schools is extremely weak. 

Addressing the Cambridge Union in 2009, Ferguson laid a humorous, yet savage attack on the academic community in failing to bring their research outside of the university. The result was not only that children in public schools failed to receive a vicarious and wide-ranging historical education, but also that many students left school feeling disenfranchised with history itself. This point is extremely crucial if we consider the large amount of poor and ethnic minority children within our public education system today. 

 

Zephaniah’s comments ultimately highlight two problems. First, the dangers of an ideologically driven history should be heeded, particularly by the current education secretary, Michael Gove. More important however, is the danger of university departments failing to engage with the wider public. Such introversion reduces history to textbooks written by untrained historians directed by political bureaucrats, which will ultimately marginalise all school pupils.

Orientalism & the Fallacy of Modernity

                                  
Earlier this year, the words 'Muslim Rage' were splashed out in bold print on the cover of Newsweek magazine. The article, written by the self proclaimed feminist, 'Muslim dissident', argued that acts of angry protest in the 'Muslim world' against a short, anti-Islamic film, actually indicated a wider deficit of modernity. Accompanied by the almost cartoon-like image of an angry Arab man, naturally boasting a beard and turban, the article followed an almost identical line of argument to that of Bernard Lewis' essay, 'The Roots of Muslim Rage'; That the Muslims, despite all Western optimism, are inherently incapable of transitioning into modernity.

The fashioning of such rhetoric is far from novel. As Edward Said argued in his seminal 'Orientalism', western observeration since the eighteenth century commonly tended to place it's own comparative constructions on what is deemed to be the 'Orient'. Such a construction, which includes the Middle East, is characterised as a completely adverse world, occupied by despotic rulers, savage practices and men with uncontrollable libido. Today however, an increasingly volatile region continues to be ravaged by conflict, the Western world finds itself facing renewed temptations to 'reconstruct' the orient. Yet, in contrast to Said's Orientalism through power relationships, the seduction of a 'new orientalism' is founded on the premise of establishing modern institutions designed to 'liberate' people from medieval tyranny.

It is therefore worth considering the underlying framework that conceptualises 'modernity'. On a superficial level, one could argue that such a notion would entail democratic institutions, freedom of speech and minority rights- particularly potent in the case of women and homosexuals. Much broader, is the suggestion that modernity necessitates pluralism, meritocracy and the acceptance of dissidence. Certainly, such a conceptualisation has been examined and developed by a great number of scholars and cultural commentators. Max Weber notoriously coined the 'Protestant work ethic' in 1905, in which he argued that European productivity was the eventual result of an amalgamation between individualism and the translation of labor as a mode of worship. The philosopher John Locke, argued that successful societies require laws that provide safeguards to private property, alongside the human rights of life and liberty. Even today, the composition of 'modern' societies seem to be primarily understood through the existence of western orientated institutions, not least by historians like Niall Ferguson, whose latest book 'Civilization : The West and the Rest', associates the rapid development of the East with the imitation and adoption of western practices. In such cases as these, the idea of modernity seems not to be one that exists upon an axiom subject to time and space, nor on alternative understandings of rights and duties. Rather, the conception is framed in a way that can only be examined as a comparative to western counterparts.

             

The appeal of such narratives lies in it's inherent simplicity- one which placed the 'modern' western world on a higher moral ground than it's 'uncivilised counterparts'. Moving toward the end of the twentieth century, the United States occupied the position of the most powerful nation on earth; it had supposedly 'defeated' communism, attained the greatest financial system in recorded history, and proclaimed itself once more as the 'leaders of the free world'. In the spirit of this triumphalism, emerged a new group of self-proclaimed liberators, who we now refer to as the neo-conservative movement. The movement, built by policy makers, think tanks, businessmen and disenfranchised academics, sought to revive the old imperial traditions of 'bringing modernity to the savage'. So, as the World Trade Centre fell to ashes in 2001, what rose, was a phoenix of opportunism. The neoconservatives that were occupying the Bush whitehouse helped to construct a narrative that claimed the moral imperative to destroy the backward, despotic enemy of modernity, and in so doing, liberate those who were deemed helpless.

In retrospect, it seems clear that the agents of modernity had failed to understand the nature of the force they challenged. For, despite the Leo Straussian inspired moral crusade, and the imaginings of the East through the lens of Bernard Lewis, the 'oriental menace' was ironically, forged in modernity. Far from the origins of Islamic thought espoused by the the early Arabian philosophers such as Ibn Khaladun and Ibn Rushd (both profound contributors to the development of later European intellectual thought). Instead, the ideologies espoused by many of the militant groups, derived from modern writers, such as Sayyid Qutb. In a series of books, Qutb had redisgned the Islamic concept of 'Jahilliyah ', a state of being which suggested a state of ignorance and promiscuity. According to Qutb, it was the duty of the Islamic community to rise up and overthrow the anti-Islamic institutions that had constructed this state, targeting the American consumer society, as well as concepts of 'unholy' rule. Following such a mode, other revolutionary Islamic thinkers, including the Iranian revolutionary, Ali Shariati, assisted in developing new conceptions of philosophical thought. Islamic liberation theology augmented through incorporating ideas of individual emancipation, evident in the thought of Frantz Fanon, amongst other prominent intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Satre. These new ideas, were ultimately built around the idea that through a revolutionary mode of Islam, one would be able to liberate himself from the effects of 'psychological opression', inherent in the moderninising efforts of self proclaimed western 'liberators'.


                       

Thus, the past decade had vidly portrayed a region far more complex and vivacious than may have ever been imagined. paradigms suggesting a conflicting battles of 'good versus evil', or 'civility and barbarianism' prove not only be be drastically distorted, but ultimately unhelpful in the long term. Instead, what is clear in a post-Arab Spring world, is the renewal of dignity and respect, from classes who have long been denied such rights. Understanding this in relation to where we are now, it seems clear that the western world may find it essential to 'modernise' the foundational understandings of modernity itself.

The Queens' Intervention : How It's More Than Just About Abu Hamza

 This article should soon be published on one of my university's student newspapers, though I'm not sure when! I've tried to look at Her Majesty, the Queen's lobbying to arrest Abu Hamza, which was accidentally leaked in a Radio program in the UK a few days ago. In the article, I've tried to suggest that while the Queen makes a valid point, her concerns on the effectiveness of English Common Law should be reflective of much wider problems that exist in the heart of our public institutions

                       
As the extremist preacher, Abu Hamza, is finally extradited to the United States, where he is accused of assisting in terrorist offences, it also emerged that Her Majesty, the Queen, had also been privately lobbying the then Home Secretary to arrest the cleric. What was surprising was not necessarily the extradition itself (which most, presumed to be inevitable anyway), but rather that the nature of such an intervention seemed grossly inappropriate for an individual whose role was once understood as a representational figurehead.  As such, public debate on the issue has split; The anti-monarchist group, Republic, have argued that the intervention demonstrates the partisan reality of the institution, whilst pro-monarchists feel the event provides further legitimacy for the Royal Family to play a more active role in public life. Regardless of this disparity, the Queen’s intervention is remarkable, purely on the grounds that in voicing her concern, she has ultimately highlighted some of the less considered failures inherent in our public institutions- those of democratic representation and the rule of law. 

We should, however, be wary of using Hamza as a way to criticise or characterise these failures. For while Hamza is overwhelmingly guilty of inciting violence and assisting with potentially dangerous activities, the problems that exist with our public institutions go far beyond this hate preacher. Consider, for example, the less-heard of , (and certainly less sinister-looking), of detainees, who will accompany Hamza to the United States, in particular, Babar Ahmad.  Mr. Ahmad, having been under arrest without trial since 2004, faces accusations from the United States of being involved with Islamic militant websites supporting Chechen and Afghan insurgents, despite an overwhelming lack of material evidence, and a peculiar demand for a US trial, on the grounds of a computer server location. Furthermore, as the European court of human rights (ECHR) ruled earlier this year that it was feasible to extradite Ahmad, the Home Secretary Theresa May ignored the pleas by both legal representatives and human rights organizations, instead opting to eagerly approach television cameras, and voicing her desire to extradite the individuals as soon as she could. And although some legal bureaucracy had initially gotten in the way of her grand political strategy, it seems that her desire has finally been realised. All this aside, one should consider that  despite years of solitary confinement, abuse and being held without trial, Ahmad’s case will only see itself relegated to a mere footnote in the current incarnation of extradition law.     

                             

One could be forgiven for dismissing this case simply as a point of law- a field where most, including myself, often find themselves lost in its obscurity.  Rather, it is perhaps, the failure of representative government in reconciling objective jurisprudence with civil liberty. Particularly, this is evident in the modified  2003 Extradition Act, legislation first introduced by the then home office minister, John Denham.  Initially designed to make the process of extradition easier between nation states, in the political context of the ‘war on terror’, it found itself  a powerful instrument to conduct ideological politics. The challenges of confronting modern terrorism, made more complex with  copious international networks,  has also presented opportunities for certain nations to strengthen their ‘special relationship’ both through mutual objectives and greater judicial compliance.  In the case of the United Kingdom and the United States,  the aims of strengthening the ‘special relationship’ have come at the expense of  common law;  Despite assurances by the United States that it would adhere to the 2003 act , twice, British foreign secretaries have had to apologise to Parliament in cases relating to inhumane torture and rendition.  In 2008, the select committee on foreign affairs expressed concern about the continuing assurances of the US in complying with the extradition act, given reports of continuing interrogation. Most recently, in the cases not just of Babar Ahmad, but also Gary Mckinnon and Talha Ashan, concern has been expressed by numerous legal and political bodies around both the nature of their alleged crimes, as well as the evidence being used to prosecute them. Yet, senior members of the British government have not responded to these trepidations, instead opting to comply with American extradition requests. Hence, as the accused now head to the United States ,  they may face an even longer detention without trial, before confronting the worst of all punishments.

Whatever we think of  the Queen’s involvement in Abu Hamza’s  case,  her inquiries do raise important concerns we should have over the health of  our  public institutions today . For, what ultimately lies behind the caricature of the ‘hooked man’, is a vicious infection within British law and democracy. And while this may suit politicians in the short term, we should let neither more Babar Ahmads, or the integrity of our public institutions, be sacrificed to entertain political point scoring.

The Revival of Orientalism ('The New Orientalism')

This is a copy of an article I published in a student newspaper at my university. It briefly examines the recent protests in the middle east, concerning a poorly-made, amateur film, 'The Innocence of Muslims', which has conjured up a mass amount of anger within the Muslim community. I have tried to take the view that there is more of this event than simply the protests themselves- in fact, a better analysis might involve a critical examination of western reactions, particularly in the context of human rights, free speech and value systems. Almost ironically, it is also occurring in the same week that Salman Rushdie, a british novelist, publishes his memoirs about the years he spent in hiding, whilst having a fatwa on his head ordained by the then Ayotollah Khomeini.

             

In light of recent protests by Muslims around the world, in reaction to the Anti-Islamic amateur movie ‘Innocence of Muslims’, the responses anticipated from western commentators were somewhat expected. Deemed as ‘anti-modern’, ‘barbaric’ and the ‘enemies of free speech’, the consensus amongst most major news outlets in Europe and the United States, seemed to be a unanimous confirmation that the post- ‘Arab Spring’ Middle East had failed to change the Muslim mentality.

Though some were subtler than others, the observation of young Muslims – once the principal drivers of the revolution – chanting angry slogans and burning flags, illustrated nothing more than the ashes of hopeful optimism, scorched by the flames of a volatile religious ideology. Indeed, no better is such disappointment reflected, than in the upcoming headline of Newsweek magazine, boldly entitled, “Muslim Rage”.
Yet, it might be these types of perceptions that prove a greater obstacle in our understanding of what we view as the ‘Muslim world’. It is certainly true that more confident and vocal Salafi groups hold a significant amount of responsibility in stirring up violence and hatred, especially amongst an empowered, but still impressionable youth.

Nonetheless, far from being the root cause, these Salafists occupy only a symptomatic position in relation to a much larger infection – one in which even in it’s first contact with the East, the Western world has failed to diagnose. ‘The Innocence of Muslims’ is more than just a film criticising the Islamic faith. Its crude depictions are not only directed at the Prophet Muhammad, but also extend to a revolting characterisation of ‘Islamic civilization’ itself – one which is moulded by barbarity, violence and overtly masculine sexual subjugation. In doing this, the film has revived the same ghosts that have haunted both prominent academics and Western policy makers in their approach to a still mysterious and elusive ‘Islamic World’.

In 1990, the historian Bernard Lewis, published an essay, entitled ‘The Roots of Muslim Rage’ in the Atlantic Monthly. In the essay, Lewis argued that ‘Muslim Civilization’ was stuck in a state of paralysis, trapped by sense of victimhood that largely derived from a multitude of successive military defeats and economic decline. The once great civilization, in Lewis’ view, could only look back at a nostalgic ‘Golden Age’, while it found itself confined in a seemingly inescapable inferiority complex – one in which dignity continually deteriorated through direct imperialism, and eventually, Western supported despotic rulers.
‘Muslim Rage’ in this sense, particularly in light of the Rushdie affair, was ultimately portrayed as proof of an anti-modern, inferior, and ultimately dangerous civilization it seemed justified for the wiser, secular West to contain. It was of course, Lewis’ contemporary, Edward Said, who had continually contested such claims. In the 1978 publication of Orientalism, Said had argued that a position such as Lewis’ simply assisted in cultivating images of a pathetic ‘Muslim peoples’, who ultimately required the West for its own good. Although Said remains a potent intellectual force in academia to this day, it was Lewis that was brought in from obscurity to the office of Dick Cheney, and it was Lewis’ view that played a fundamental role in developing America’s Middle East strategy during the Bush years.

If the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East have taught us anything, it is the confirmation that perceptions of a backward, anti-modern Middle East do little to reflect the obvious realities. Yet, for all the openness and curiosity of its people, we should understand that the role of the Islamic faith, and the Prophet Muhammad, remains a central component in both practical organisation and communal identification- particularly in a climate where such beliefs have assisted significantly in dismantling heinous despotic regimes.
Yet, despite this early revival, it still seems too tempting for us to revert back to a toxic narrative entrenched in outdated ideology, where Muslims are rendered helpless by their own inadequacies and a ‘backward’ rejection of seemingly superior Western, democratic values. The continuation of such condescending beliefs, whether through artistic expression or public policy, will not just augment frustration and anger. Ultimately, it will do little to heal our already fragile relations with the post-Arab Spring region.

The Randian Resurrection

Last week was the GOP national convention, so I thought it might be interesting to look at one of their stars, the Vice Presidential nominee, Paul Ryan. For those of you that don't know, Paul Ryan is most famous for forging the 'intellectual framework' of the Republican party, best embodied in the 'Ryan Plan' for a recovered America.

On the surface, Ryan shouldn't really be that interesting. In fact, he's a rather boring economics nerd,  hailed as the 'intellectual figurehead' of the GOP- a humorous, yet also disturbing title to be ordained with, considering the present state of the party. Yet, in this electoral season, the ' Ryan plan' , seems to be serving various goals. Firstly, to assist in repositioning the electoral narrative, shifting focus away from personality politics to one based primarily on economic strategy. The second objective, is much more interesting, In  a semi-religious fashion, the plan has, in an almost biblical way, resurrected a rather peculiar character of the late twentieth century- one whose philosophical presence has permeated into American politics on more than one occasion. This entity, is Ayn Rand.

Rand had escaped Soviet Russia in 1926, settling instead, for New York city. She worked intially as a screenwriter for many popular 'epic films' , while simultaneously writing her own fiction. In 1957, She wrote her most famous novel- the one in which Paul Ryan has claimed to gain much of his inspiration- Atlas Shrugged. It was also the novel that framed her peculiar, but oddly popular philosophy- one that espoused the virtues of elitism- not only by justifying the presence of elites in society, but also suggesting that they were necessary for any society to flourish. In the Randian view, these elites, or in her words, the 'prime movers' should be cherished by society, as their presence subsequently gave a more profound meaning to one's life, than that of the state or it's bureaucrats. The philosophical foundation of the Randian world view, was what she referred to as 'Objectivism'. Here is an interesting video, where she explains this philosophy;

While Paul Ryan has insisted that Rand's novels serve only as a source of inspiration relating to policy, there is a startling degree of complexity woven within her narratives. In fact, the free market rhetoric that forms the basis of Randian-inspired ideology within the current GOP, serves merely as a simplistic, if not superficial interpretation of her body of work. Although Rand certainly believed in such ideals, her novels are probably more useful in illustrating the exercise of power within the Randian world, and how her objectivist philosophy does not simply manifest itself within the market economy, but as an extension, forms the basis of human relationships. Indeed, both her famous novels, The Foutainhead and Atlas Shrugged not only reject moral frameworks that do not encompass the self,  but also illustrate the triumphs of objectivism in its confrontation with other philosophies. Through physical action and material manifestations, fantastical worlds are constructed within both the novels; The Foutainhead follows the 'prime mover'  Howard Roark's relentless defence of his artistic integrity and vision, against the tyrannical bureaucrats. Atlas Shrugged further conveys these principles through the protagonist and model prime-mover, John Galt. In response to the oppression of the state against the 'prime movers', Galt organises the exodus of the other prime movers (creatives, financiers and other such elites), as a means not to create the Randian world elsewhere, but rather, and in a rather peculiar, masochistic fashion, watch society erode in absence of the elites. The 'moral' (if one would continue to use this term) of the story however, has less to do with the evils of big government (as the GOP and other such conservatives seem to have interpreted) than the nature of the Randian universe itself. The order of this environment does not lie in the notion of 'free and equal individuals', but rather, an understanding that elites in society, the 'prime-movers' occupy an elevated status that must be exempt from any attempted form of moral regulation. Furthermore, as these elites endow onto wider society, a successful model of organising and distribution, they are also granted the right to 'protect' and 'regulate' those that are lesser than them. Thus, it seems to be the case that the Randian world is far from Paul Ryan's libertarian utopia- instead, it proposes a different organisation of society whereby the prime movers are granted legitimacy, simply on the basis that they are superior beings. 

How this superiority is acquired, seems less to do with economics than a peculiar, Randian understanding of power- which are depicted in the characterisation of  her 'heroes'. The Fountainhead sees the architect, Roark as the sole defender of his vision for a skyscraper, against the bulwark of  'mediocrity', who in Roark's eyes, exists only to compromise his creativity. Yet more often than not, one fails in the attempt to interpret the nature of Roark's vision itself. What are the components of the fantasy, which make it absolute? In this case, I'd argue that Roark's vision does not simply embody a creative idea for a building. Rather, it embodies a constructed fantasy as an extension of himself; In accepting this compromise, Roark would not only gives up the sky scraper in it's material form, but also his own individuality,all to what Rand describes as the parastic system, designed specifically to restrict the 'prime mover'. Roark, the Randian hero, finds himself existing it a nightmare world, but one in which he must retain his integrity to survive. Similarly, the exploration of power in Atlas Shrugged also centres around an assumed dominance of the 'prime-movers', although more explicity directed toward government and bureaucrats. The chants of 'Who is John Galt?' that embody street slogans, also allude to the metaphysical notion of the self. In this case, Galt, the Randian hero, elucidates not only a man superior in practical purpose (ie. in terms of organisation and physical rebellion), but similarly acts as symbolic of  'power' itself, within the Randian universe. As such, Galt's organised rebellion effectively removes the life-source of society, rendering it helpless and pathetic, left only with the failed parental state, destroyed by the virtues of collectivism and egalitarianism. The novel ends with the return of the 'prime-movers', the true parental figureheads of the society, and with whom natural order is restored. Ultimately, Rand shows us that it is these movers that have constructed the world for the benefit of lesser mortals, and as such, can just as easily dismantle, or re-build it in their image- and with a greater degree of perceived legitimacy. 

 More interestingly, what of the psychological, or rather, the psycho-sexual dimensions within the Randian world? It seems to me, that in our examination of Rand today, commentators look too much toward her ideas of moral economy, and in this case, taking the position that 'self-interest' being the only rational mode of existence, is somewhat incomplete. For it is in examining human behaviour itself, that Rand forms the basis of her peculiar philosophy, and nowhere is this more evident than in sexual conduct.  Yet, not so long ago, the now notorious philosopher, Slavoj Zizek, wrote a paper in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies  examining her body of work through this very approach.  In the paper,  Zizek argued that the 'Randian world' was somewhat representative of a pure capitalism, without the sugar-coated pills offered by the evils of government. In this pure world, the Randian heroes, or the prime movers, would occupy a position somewhat innocent of the evils such sugar-coated pills assist in developing; thus, Roarke's uncomprimising stance on his creative integrity can only be seen as a moral good,  because man himself is working toward the greatest good he can internally occupy. Roarke requires no recognition from others to make moral judgements on his actions, possibly for the sole reason that such external judgements hold little meaning. Such an idea might be best analysed through this clip of The Fountainhead motion picture;

In this case, I feel that Zizek has probably come closest in accurately depicting the 'Randian hero' has much more than simply an economic prime mover. While conservative Randians may view Roarke and Galt as ultimate justification of free market capitalism (effectively becoming ideological commodities), Zizek instead exposes their innermost drives, making clear that the need to satisfy their internal desires can make them capable of the very things the Radian hero is supposed to be devoid of- in this case, love for the other. In Atlas Shrugged, the removal of the 'prime movers' brings about the erosion of  the harmonious, industrial society. The movers make clear that the 'other' are dependent on them, and thus occupy a more powerful position when they return. Yet, why do the prime movers return back to the society that rejected them? The prodigal sons here, do not return with sorrow and repentance, but rather, with triumph- and a 'love' for the other. It may be the case that just as the other is dependent on the prime mover to survive, the legitimacy of the mover is subsequently concentrated on the acquired legitimacy of the other. A distinction, however, does remain in place- while the mover's motivation lies in the drive for self satisfaction, the 'other' is driven by a desire for the mover. No more is this better illustrated than in a particular scene of The Fountainhead, where the dialectic between Roark and Domonique are explored. Domonique is characterised as the 'other', consumed only by a desire for Roark, whilst Roark, driven only by his vision, views Domonique only as a means to settle temporary satisfaction, all of it being completely unattached from emotions.  For Rand, notions of sex were not simply that of emotional engagement, but were rather based on rational values and principles; If extended to the rape scene in The Fountainhead,  one might suggest that Roark is both fulfilling his primal, temporary urges, as well as re-inforcing the paradigm of the Randian world, whereby as a prime mover, he occupied a position where he may overpower Domonique, with the latter's full compliance. Meanwhile, if Domonique was to have a meaningful relationship with Roark, she must 'transition from desire to drive', adapting her value system to fit within the Randian understanding of the rational world- one in which sexual action acts as a means to fulfil rational, individual needs, as well as to maintain it's established, hierarchical tenants.

Such analyses as that of Zizek, show just how complex Rand actually is. Those that adore her,mainly tend to see her too much as a prophet of the free-market cause, preferring to ignore the depth of human exploration necessary to achieve such aims. Indeed, Rand shows that particular psychological conditions have to be in place for the rational, free market to remain in place- much of which challenges general understandings of morality today. Yet similarly, those that dismiss her ideas, may also be short sighted. While Rand believed heavily in the objectivist ideology, it might be the case that even she misappropriated the philosophical tenants behind her ideas, which when applied outside the economic sphere, appear contradictory. Whether Paul Ryan has really thought about Rand in such depth, I'm not sure, but I suppose that might be the reason why her resurrection was fairly short-lived.