'Fiscal Cliff' Crisis Is A Game Of Identity Politics

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While the Mayan prophecy may have not been fulfilled, at the stroke of midnight tonight- an event might just come close to such  insatiable wrath.

A failure to strike a deal on Fiscal Policy in the United States (going 'over' the cliff) has been characterised as an event with horrific consequences. Cuts in welfare and social security, potential rise in taxes for middle-class families- even the prospect of tipping back into recession (this time, about 100 times worse than 2008-9) have worked to conjure up images of filth, degradation and of course, the inevitable decline of civilisation. 'What happens if I starve because all the stores are closed?', 'How am I going to get to work in the morning?' , 'What if the fiscal cliff sends us to oblivion, where we become savages and throw poop at each other?'- These are just a sample of the reactions concerning the crisis.

The most interesting part of the  negotiations is that these  aren't simply economic questions, but rather, a kind of like a hangover of the 2012 election- essentially,  an exercise of identity politics. 

The current negotiations are basically playing out, as Professor Ian Robertson says here, a bit like a game theory model. Looking at it this way, the negotiations, there is an acknowledgement that both Republicans (R) and Democrats (D) have mutual interests- in this case, not going into recession, not upsetting the markets (great job, guys), not losing the credit rating, and not raising taxes on that all-important middle class.  But while there are mutual interests, the main difference lies in the Bush Tax Cuts. (D) wishes to extend some of the tax cuts, mainly on middle-income earners, (R) wishes to extend all of them.  You can see, in Jacob Geller's play-off matrix, (which has quite a good value-system) that a deal is likely to be brokered, with (D) gaining slightly more leverage than (R). But, this model assumes that the mutual interest being brokered is one that avoids the cliff- in essence, that in understanding the choices within the matrix, you have to account for the wider values of the collective goal of stability.

So, what if Professor Robertson's third point- about the psychological tendency for Schadenfreude, is the most prevalent component of the negotiations? In this case, would either Obama or the GOP prefer 'going over the cliff'?'. This posits a different type of matrix- one in which long-term political advantage plays a more important role than a mutual aim to balance the economy. Indeed, if safeguarding the economy was the priority to either party, then the bill signed in 2010 mandating the deficit reduction probably wouldn't have passed so hastily anyway. Political advantage is obviously much harder to quantify, but I would guess that in the post-election climate, the GOP will probably bear much more of the blame for negative externalities as shown here.  Obama and Biden are unlikely to budge on their position, probably due to a perceived post election mandate,  and their own comprimises relating to entitlements and the Bush tax cuts. Republicans might think they can repeat 2010-11 mid-term action, where they could hold the administration hostage until tax cuts would be accepted, but a stronger and more resilient Obama is probably going to be more confrontational. I haven't attempted to quantify this particular scenario, but my guess would be that even in this situation, the GOP would lose more by refusing to budge from their position. Further, they would be hurt significantly more in the the 2014 mid-terms by refusing to compromise on tax, social security and entitlements than Obama or the Democrats would from maintaining their position.

From what I can see at the moment, a deal is likely to be struct around the 11th hour. That's because the fiscal cliff is really much more about the GOP trying to reassert a political identity after it's defeat earlier this year. Even in this case, the GOP finds itself damaged by the ideological positions it took since 2008- bolstering in tea-party social conservatives, letting notions of the 'small state' overshadow wider ideas of the 'just' state, as well as marginalising the minority groups of which their ideal cuts would impact the most. Boenher knows this too, which is why he'll probably be inclined to allow the tax rises on the richest 10% as well as significant cuts to the defence industry. Unfortunately, the GOP misappropriated the political mood of the nation, sticking to the same ideological positions that lost them the election. What the speaker should realise, is that folding right now, might help his party's long road to recovery come 2016. 

Laws Alone Won't Curb India's Rape Culture

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After the brutal gang-rape of an Indian female student in Delhi, marking the 637th recorded case this year, India has been forced to confront the darkest elements of it's cultural history. Though little information that has been released, women across the subcontinent have organised in protest against an inherently misogynistic culture that has seemingly legitimised such actions, at the expense of their dignity. As more women have spoken out of their own experiences in the past few days, many of the protesters have encouraged the end of a passive culture of acceptance, in which females are systemically degraded and reduced as human beings.

Such horrific events might be viewed as uncharacteristic, particularly in a modernising metropolis, notorious for eulogising notions of love. Indeed, India's long-concealed history of gang-rape and molestation provides no better a juxtaposition to the bastions of romance exhibited by the Taj Mahal or the booming Bollywood industry. Yet, behind these romantic fantasies, exists over a century of culturally-induced sexual repression, affecting the most vulnerable in Indian society. Indeed, as the writer Arundhati Roy has noted, India's toxic rape culture does not simply expose the crudest forms of sexism, but, in turn, also reveals the cynical corruption of the apathetic political class.

Accusations of an institutionalised 'rape culture' is not novel. One only has to look at the unreformed 1860 penal code that views rape as an 'outraging' of a woman's modesty, an association that immediately affiliates the female body merely as a constituent within a masculine-dominated cultural system. Additionally, the law professor Upendra Baxi noted in 2002, that the legal and political systems of India limited the abilities of females to report sexual violence, and in turn reflected a political system in which collective sexual assaults on women could go unpunished. Baxi also highlighted that police authorities often neglected, if not participated in, the phenomenon of 'eve-teasing' - a crude form of sexual molestation that has more than quadrupled over the past decade. Indeed, despite the rapid economic prosperity India has enjoyed since it's independence, little has been achieved to in terms of effective protections for females.

Prime Minister Singh must realise that attempts to codify greater legal protections will benefit only a minority of women, most of whom are concentrated in affluent, urban environments with means to afford security. Despite the basic protections in place, there have been countless occasions where police officers have been accused of actively endorsing such activities.

Officers in New Delhi alone have stated on record, that "male agression is a natural instinct of sexual attraction" and possibly more mortifying, that young girls who share telephone numbers and dances with young boys, indicate legitimate consent. If law enforcement cannot understand the distinction between rape and consensual sex, or even empathise with the vulnerability of young females, then even the most intricate of legal systems will have little effect on rapists and molesters.

What must be realised, is that India should be proactive in challenging certain elements of traditional culture, if it truly wishes to succeed in securing the rights and liberties of its females. One of the most powerful messages held by a young protester this week read: "We live in a society that teaches women not to get raped, instead of teaching men not to rape". Simple as it may be, this statement truly reaches at the crux of this problem.

For the true injustice lies in how women are still recieved in Indian society. Despite phenomenal acheivements in education, professional and public life, women still find themselves devalued within archaic, patriarchal communities where family units unconditionally adore their sons.

Certainly, the denigration of females is often articulated in terms of sexuality, whereby the functions of females are seen merely in bearing and raising children. Further, the lack of sex education in public schools, combined with the staples of brutish masculinity and the fragile damsel within Bollywood cinema, are fundamental in defining gender relationships between males and females. Indeed, such misappropriated fantasies contribute significantly to both the devaluation of sexual relations, as well as fueling an insidious culture of victim-blame.

In justifying their actions, the rapists argued that it was necessary to punish the victim for deviating against societal expectations. In taking lessons from this, Indian autorities should realise that rape is a culturally imbedded problem. To truly defeat it, they must first work to reform the cultural dynamics of society itself.

Does faith have a role in the legal process?

I came across this  interesting article this morning. Legal philosophy is something I've been interested in for a while, as well as something that still tempts me to apply for graduate jobs at Law firms (an exercise that has thus far failed horrifically).

The article, written by the barrister Fatim Jumabhoy, looks at a specific case between two parties and a specific arbitration clause within a mutually consented contract. The legal problem alluded to, is one whereby a previously disregarded arbitration clause between the parties becomes a focal point within legal practice, and more importantly, questions relating to the relationship between individual parties and legal counsel; In this case, whether the parties have the legitimate right to discriminate against their arbiter on the grounds of religious conviction.

I'm not a lawyer, or a law student- so this blog post won't contain footnotes of specific cases, or an in-depth knowledge on the mechanics of legal practice (on a side note, I'm too broke to afford temporary access to law journals online...), so the basis of my thoughts are situated more on philosophical notions- ie. the nature of individual or communal recognition and it's  relationship with courts of law operating within democratic civil society.

Arbitration is a form of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) whereby a matter settled outside of court may take place through mediation with a specific arbiter. Arbitration is also a popular method of resolving disputes; for business, it is often faster than processes of litigation, as well as considerably more cheap. Complex matters can also be conducted much more easily, as parties themselves have a great deal more control over the process than within a court hearing.

One of the complexities in Jivraj v. Hashwani [2010] therefore lies in the acknowledgement of cultural preferences- ie. In desiring that the proceedings are undertaken by counsel with significant knowledge of their cultural community, an arbitration process conducted by 'specialists' is desirable.

Yet, I feel that a more profound legalistic problem also exists at this point, relating more significantly to the relationship between courts of law and complex multicultural society- one in which dominant theories of justice do not have the capacity to accommodate minority cultures with abstracted legal systems. Jumabhoy notes that the original agreement between the two parties stipulated that   :

"any disputes arising from their joint venture agreement should be subject to arbitration, and that the arbitrators should be ‘respected members of the Ismaili community and holders of high office within the community". 

Such a request is of course indicative that in the study of the  nature of individual rights, ownership, property etc. were to be  acknowledged by the arbiter within a specific system of assumed cultural relationships, distant from assertions of the common law system. In turn, the need for an Ismaili arbiter lay specifically in assuring that the both party's assertions of justice were met. This of course, raises a number of problems immediately. First, is the problem of secular courts recognising or indeed accommodating cultural demands deemed irregular- indeed, the Ismaili arbiter may have been able to recognise the cultural identities of each party in a way that a non-Ismaili representatives could not. For both modes of justice to work in conjunction, recognition and reconciliation of different notions of rights must be acknowledged. Second, lies more within the discourse between secular and faith-based forms of justice. In requesting an arbiter from a 'high position within the community' the Ismaili system of justice assumes that specific individuals with different qualifications (ie. a degree from a Hawza as opposed to certification from the English Law Society) assume just as much authority as representatives within secular courts. While an agreed consensus might be easy to reach within this specific case, when one extrapolates this idea to cases of marriage, divorce and family issues, assumed ideas of individual rights between both systems may be difficult to articulate. Indeed, as Ayelet Shachar has noted, many civil rights and Muslim feminist groups have argued that such assumptions often lead to significant disadvantages for women, minority groups and marginalised individuals.


The second problem highlighted in this case relates to the relationship between law and civil society, particularly in multicultural states. A popular notion is that the law operates as a binding framework that works govern society, setting out rules, rights and principles that are objective, and therefore beyond ethnic, cultural and religious contentions.  Indeed, one of the key conflicts in the High Court on this case, was a consideration of the role of the Arbiter being subject to specific employment legislation. While understanding the importance of independence in arbitration, the court noted that religious or national discrimination may be allowed if there was demonstration of a sufficient need. Thus, they ruled that in operating within a specific religious ethos, Jivraj did have a legitimate claim to the necessity of an Ismaili arbiter.

While the ruling was widely supported within the city, future problems have certainly been anticipated. In my opinion, the main problem lies in the balance in the distribution of fair justice, as well as the capacity for law to recognise and accommodate a vicarious range of traditional communities within the UK. For the latter, such acknowledgement comes at the price of questioning what claims for discrimination are legitimate (for example, whether it may be justified to rule out ethnic, sexual or gender groups) , and indeed, maintaining the universal rights held in the  EU Charter. In addition, I think there are some more interesting philosophical problems relating to Law as a consumer good- for example, in choosing forms of dispute resolution that take place outside the court, should parties have more ownership of the legal process? Does such ownership limit the realisation of the fairest possible outcome?

Overall, while I'd be inclined to agree with the court's decision, I expect a lot of these questions to emerge in the future, both within the courts of law and in Parliament.

My issue with Christmas (Or why Scrooge was right)

 

I've never been a huge fan of Christmas. Beyond the  dissolved religious value of the holiday (and if we were actually celebrating it, we'd be celebrating sometime in January, after a month of fasting), something about the holiday period still makes me despair for humanity.  Perhaps it's those last minute shoppers, barging through crowds of pedestrians to reach the zenith of Marks & Spencer to get the last coffee-maker on the shelf, which will only be used twice before its relegation to the storage cabinet. Or, it might be the ever elusive, abstract construction of the 'Christmas Spirit', a weird exertion of Marx's 'opiate' that  encourages a temporary therapy from material problems, through engaging with a material individualism. Certainly, it's genius is not in the resultant amnesia that the tyrannical spirit bequeaths on those that accept it, but how it has been constructed, branded and utilised within common discourse to encourage irrational purchasing.

Many people have commented on my reservations for Christmas, and I've had my fair amount of 'Scrooge!' accusations- or (more novel, I think) , 'Oh it's because you're Muslim, innit'. Much of this probably has to do with an acknowledgement that these types of national holidays should be exempt from post-modern tendencies of deconstruction; Probably the best modern example could be seen in those who criticised the celebration of the Queen's jubilee, or even the Royal wedding, only to find themselves marginalised by a collective sense of apathy. In other words, 'shut up and enjoy the company' seems to be the dominant mantra of stoical, modern, secular Britain today.

The second contention, is that the Christmas of the 'post-modern' undergoes a foundational transition along the same lines as society; ie. that the Christmas of a 'Godless' society transitions from one of ecclesiastical worship to tendencies more altruistic and communal. Christmas is about 'giving', 'sharing' and 'caring' and whatever other type of utopian verb one can conjure up from a seasonal advertisement from Sainsburys. But it is within this particular form of political economy, that allows the 'Christmas spirit' truly to truly thrive, constructing a temporary reality whereby the assumed individualist tendencies of society are forgotten. In this sense, the 'spirit' does not create, but rather induces an unreachable possibility of a world devoid of destructive selfishness.

There is of course, a peculiar irony behind such messages. In the past few years, collective social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, have helped to spark debates on the social role of corporations within the wider economy- particularly in terms of wages, labour rights and the nature of production. Furthermore, the movements have opened up wider concerns relating to social dependence on mass consumption, whereby products might be seen through the lens of Baudrillard; - situated within discursive systems of meaning and identity, and in so doing work to define social value.

The dark side of the 'post-modern' construction of Christmas therefore seems to lie within the flux of this transition. On the one hand, the holiday has been liberated from its religious monopoly, in turn signifying the the substantial power shift between Church and society over the past couple of decades. Yet, this has not necessarily created the reciprocal communality that non-religious advocates of Christmas have tend believe in. Rather, I'd argue that different relationships between advertisers and consumers have been forged, constituting more personalised contracts. In this case, consumers who purchase particular products also buy into the necessary altruist actions- ones which are required to fill those gaping emotional holes eclectically illustrated in seminal Christmas ads.

To me, Christmas posits an alternate realm in which the tyrannical Christmas spirit presents itself as  "emotional consumerism with a human face", by which I mean the actual act of purchasing and giving give products meaning themselves. If we consider that this manipulation is the inevitable product of the relationship between advertising companies and corporations, then altruistic meanings are not simply attributed to products, but also define the processes of exchange and communal gathering. Indeed, as a notorious advertisement suggests, "This is not just Christmas, this is an M&S Christmas".

Sadly, Humiliation Is An Intrinsic Part of Media Culture

This article was published in the Huffington Post on 12/11/2012. The link can be found at : http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/hussein-kesvani/sadly-humiliation-is-an-i_b_2277550.html

As the two Australian DJ's responsible for the 'Royal Baby Hoax' were interviewed on television last night, their composure could not have been any further from the charismatic radio presenters they had been a few days ago. Dishevelled, insecure and broken, both Mel Grieg and Michael Christian appeared tearfully remorseful in their desperate attempt to seek redemption. Yet, the DJ's were not just seeking forgiveness from the bereaved family of Jacintha Saldanha. They also appealed for clemency from the wider media culture that in the past few days has transformed them into villains.

There is however, a peculiar irony that lies behind such characterisations. For while the actions of Grieg and Christian were certainly deplorable, they are also far from uncommon in the modern media industry. Nor is the exploitation of humilation and shame something novel to to the culture of entertainment. Indeed, it is often the case that even our most beloved sources of popular entertainment thrive on such vindications, and worse- our society has often been too complacent in allowing this to take place.

This is clearly demonstrated in what has become a staple of British prime-time television, The X Factor, which aired it's 2012 series finale last weekend. While positioning itself as a champion of meritocracy, it routinely juxtaposes two different narratives, and in so doing creates a peculiar pantomime-like spectacle; contrasting a 'rags to riches' theatrical tale of the victors ascendance to fame, while intermitently broadcasting a series of purposefully cringe-inducing and less than melodic renditions of well-known pop songs.. Though maintaining the popularity of the franchise, such a dichotomy inevitably results in a cynical dehumanisation of the latter category of contestants, who find themselves rendered as objects designed solely for entertainment pleasure. They are designed for the purpose of humiliation, which in itself contributes to the overall success of the show.

Even when this structure changes, perhaps most evident through the 2009 runner-up Susan Boyle, this mentality resonates. In this case, it was not Ms.Boyle's vocal talents which amazed viewers, but rather the idea that she was devoid of all the aesthetic qualities viewers had come to expect. Ms.Boyle was not simply a contestant- she was also an object who's oddity attracted higher viewer ratings.

Further, one only has to look at the recent controversy surrounding a Brazillian prank show that used terrifying practical jokes to humiliate unknowing people using an elevator, or indeed it's milder and more popular counterpart, the MTV hit show 'Punk'd'. Both programmes use staged practical jokes as a means to trick their victims, of which are then broadcast for viewers to enjoy. But in doing so, this type of progamming continues the process of dehumanising and objectifying their victims, ultimately rendering them helpless to forces that exploit their shame.What is often forgotten in cases such as Ms. Saldanha's, particularly by consumers of these forms of media, is the intensity of the trauma that comes afterword- the embrassment as well as the personal convictions of inadequacy. Indeed, it is easy to forget that outside the pantomime world that these practical jokes take place in, are the victims who have involuntarily become sacrificed to satisfy an almost fetishised addiction for public humiliation.

What has created this misanthropic media culture? Some have blamed a cosmopolitan notion of individualism that has replaced empathy with apathy. Others lay blame on the infatuation with celebrity- one where consumers take pleasure in seeing the inadequacies and imperfections of public figures exposed.

However, it is perhaps the case that the actions of Grieg and Christian simply reflect the way in which popular entertainment has transformed, particularly in the wake of new technology and the

methods by which consumers can participate with modern media. Where it is designed to inform and entertain, media culture naturally orientates toward the wants of prospective audiences, providing them with the cheap thrills, raunchy stories and public shaming needed for a brief moment of escapsim. Whether in reality television, soap operas or the pages of gossip magazines, such stories appeal to us simply because it feeds into a fantasy world peculiarly relatable to us.

While Grieg and Christian to hold some responsibility to the tragic death of Ms.Saldanha, we should not be apathetic to the culture which allowed such humiliation to take place. In particular, it should be understood that beyond the fictional worlds created by popular media are those victims, like Ms. Saldanha and many others, who have the same insecurities and vulnerabilities as the audience that observes them. If there is anything that we can learn from Ms. Saldanha's case, it is surely that they deserve the right to retain their dignity too.

The Autumn Statement Does Not Address The Inequality Problem

 Photo from : Kevin Coombs/Reuters via guardian.co.uk

In closing his Autumn Statement, chancellor George Osborne left the British public with three things. First, that in contrast to his self-assured prophecy, it would be unlikely that he would be able to achieve the goal of reducing national debt as a ratio of gross domestic product (GDP). Second, that the 'era of austerity' would not cease until 2017-18, substantially undermining the credibility of his fiscal rules. Third, however, was the point that the chancellor didn't make explicit- that in attempting to orientate economic policy to the political development of a 'smaller state' the present condition of the economy has failed to ignite desperately needed economic growth.

It is therefore rather puzzling, that the chancellor continues to play politics with the economy. Despite of all the common rhetoric we have come to expect from the chancellor, particularly in his cynical attacks against the labour party, what has been glossed over is how marginalised groups are rendered the most vulnerable in Osborne's economic plans. Researchers at the Joseph Rowntree Foundation have shown that a real-term cut in welfare will do little to help the estimated 6.1 million people living in poverty in working households. The chancellor (and probably some Lib Dems) might try counter this through the £235 increase in personal allowance tax, but while this might benefit some low-income earners, it is likely to inflict a great deal of damage to low income working families on means-tested benefits. Indeed, it seems peculiar that those at the recieving end of Osborne's failing economic strategy- those rule-abiding, aspirational families, are the ones who will receive the most punishment for the years ahead.

Contrast this with the much lobbied for action to reduce corporate rates of tax to just 21% in 2014, a two percent decrease. This is not only indicative of a continuing ideological position whereby tax relief will automatically stimulate job creation, but it also illustrates the chancellor's disregard of how important small and medium sized enterprises are to recovery. In particular, the statement said little in relation to the apparent funds available at the planned Business Bank, or how prospective entrepeneurs can gain easier access to equitable sums of capital. And indeed, while a a levy is still in place for large banks, the OBR has estimated that HM revenue is likely to collect £2.5 billion per annum, less than half a percent greater than under the last government. All of this shows the chancellor's personal conviction of his strategy- one in which the approval of the markets and the AAA rating are retained, and where large corporations are the saviours of the economy, at the expense of under-capitalised small-medium enterprises.

Ultimately, the failures shown by the autumn statement do little to alieviate both intrinsic economic problems, as well as the wider social issues that come from it. In fact, this may indeed be one of the central problems faced by the chancellor. In attempting to maintain the nation's reputation on the markets, the chancellor has opted for an approach designed to keep the status-quo in place. The price of such an approach is retaining the inherent societal inequality that comes with it- one in which the most wealthy contribute much less as a share of income compared to the most vulnerable, of whom face further risks of cuts to welfare and public services.

Thus, the chancellor should take away two lessons from his statement. First, that in breaking both his fiscal rules, a rethink of his deficit reduction strategy needs to focus more on long-term job creation. This might require significantly more investment into infrastructure projects. Second, and probably more important, is an acknowledgement that the condition of the economy directly relates to the nature of society itself. It is futile to believe that sustainable, long term growth can be achieved without confronting inequality, not just through monetary approaches, but also in providing the opportunities necessary for young people to flourish. 

Same Sex Couples Will Not Benefit From Marriage In Churches : (Personal View)

                     

When I first started this blog- as a means of overstating my somewhat miniscule relevance in both student journalism and indeed, 'opinions' in general, I never intended to look at things which had overtly emotional overtones. Yet, when hearing today that David Cameron has given the green light for same-sex marriages to be carried out in religious institutions (although, I expect this is mainly focused on the Church of England), a few things really surprised me. In particular, I think that this political posturing shouldn't be celebrated, or entertained.

First things first, the boring stuff; The Prime Minister (and probably the rest of the cabinet, including what might be an agitated Theresa May) has really only voiced his opinion and subsequently will be proposing the bill in Parliament. Whether or not the bill will actually go through, I don't know. (I expect it will likely pass, albeit with many abstentions and Tory rebellions). However, this blogpost isn't about the inner workings of the British parliament, or the complications such a bill must go through to be passed. It's also not about the European Court of Human Rights enforcing the principle in law.

Yet, you might wonder why, as a self-claimed 'wooly liberal', particularly one that believes in the benefits of a pluralistic society, why I am not rushing to my twitter feed to praise David Cameron (or berate some homophobes). Rest assured, it's not because I've suddenly become an orthodox Muslim, nor homophobic.

In fact,  I'd suggest that the realities of actualising such a bill stray far beyond the amiable intentions of the Prime Minister, and is more likely to further disenfranchise same-sex couples, particularly in their relationship with religious institutions.

Much of this has to do with the structure of the proposal itself. Cameron has already said that same-sex marriage ceremonies will be based on an opt-in policy, which in my eyes is hardly revolutionary, nor indicative of the great reform. This point is particularly crucial if we are to look at an institution such as the Church of England (CofE), which serves not only as a figurehead of Christianity, but also as a vital part of political and civic culture. Yet, with the CofE being rather vocal in opposing the proposal, it seems unlikely that many churches will 'opt-in' to proposals of administering ceremonies. True, other churches will take an opposite view- some Anglican, Protestant and Quaker churches have come out in favour. But this does not remove the fact that same-sex couples are likely to occupy the same social position within civil society itself. The CofE is not only a religious force, but also one that wields a great deal of cultural influence; with a reaction to what might be seen as government intervention in sacred institutions, it's not unlikely that the CofE will reassert the sanctity of it's traditional practices through further hostility to homosexual couples seeking to be married in the Church. Indeed, this might also be worse for religious institutions that fall outside the political structures of the country- namely in Mosques and Synagogues, where an extremely stringent definition of marriage is in place.

More vital in this debate, is the way in which 'marriage' is actually conceptualised in the first place. Many who support the idea of equal marriage do so under the premise that the existing status-quo distinguishes between 'civil unions' and 'marriages' and as such devalue the former over the latter. While civil unions are legitimised by the state, the argument goes that the term 'marriage' denotes something much more profound and removed from legalistic connotations. On this basis, it is argued that marriage should be extended on the grounds that it provides the same legitimacy to all forms of relationships.  However, it might just be this assertion that proves the biggest obstacle of achieving recognition of equal partnerships.

If there is one thing that unifies both the 'for' and 'against' camps in relation to same sex marriage, it is that a fundamental component of 'marriage' is one founded on love and commitment.  But why must such an acknowledgement necessarily derive from those that run religious institutions? Particularly those who not only oppose the union itself, but find the very entity threatening to it's definition of marriage as an institution? Desirable as it might be, I feel that same-sex couples will sadly be unable to reconcile such differences in the long-run.

In this case, I think that there are two options same-sex couples (and indeed, others as well) should lobby for. First, is the libertarian idea of removing the concept of 'marriage' from the privileged monopoly status of the state. While this would mean that Churches and other religious institutions may have the freedom not to wed same-sex couples, it would also open up a market for other groups to carry out ceremonies using the term 'married'. While this approach might create a more level playing field, couples will still face problems within society, particularly in the way that some religious institutions may claim greater authority to marriage than others. In this case, a second approach might be more desirable- one whereby the concept of 'civil partnerships' becomes 'state-recognised marriage'. In this case, while all couples could legally be 'married' with the acknowledgement of the state, it would come at the cost of souring relations with a more aggravated, and possibly more hostile church. Possibly, there might be a third option; while it's certainly clear that governments can do little in terms of forcing religious institutions to host same-sex marriages, history has shown that the Church has always reformed when continual pressure is placed on it's relevance and legitimacy. While the road is arduous, equal marriage activists might find that a true long-term change may only come from further direct challenges to the church itself.