A friend asked me recently to explain the situation happening in Russia/Ukraine. Having tried to write a 'summary' several times- struggling to do so in each instance, it's clear that the current situation is too complicated to neatly box up.
Moreover, as someone who doesn't speak Russian or Ukrainian (relying on translations, edits and other reporters to summarise information) there's always the danger of inaccuracies, cultural biases and unreliable sources.
So I'm going to try my best to summarise what's going on in Ukraine from a journalist's perspective, and hopefully link out some pieces with far more insight.
As a primer, I'd highly recommend Buzzfeed's 35-step guide to understanding the current crisis. It starts from the fall of the USSR- where Ukraine became an independent state. There's an interesting part in Samuel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations in which he predicts conflict between Russia and the Ukraine to be low, because they were part of the same 'civilization' block. Huntington's thesis held a lot of clout in the 90's. So much so, that Ukraine's first president Leonid Kravchuk actually got rid of his nuclear weapons via Russia, and was considered Boris Yeltsin's most powerful ally in the Balkans. There's a second, important component to this too.
The Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, was an agreement that guaranteed the independence of Ukraine in exchange for the destruction of the nuclear weapons (Ukraine had the third largest stockpile at the time). With the invasion of Crimea, the US and possibly EU member states are using the document as the foundation of any economic or military action in the future.
The first question is really a legal one; Was Putin right to send forces to Crimea?
Pro-Russian reports conversely argue that such reports are proof of American power games. In a press conference held last week, Putin told journalists that he did not want a war with Ukraine, and that any action in Crimea were designed to protect ethnic Russians (more than 80% ) from radicals in the rebel forces. He acknowledged that Yanukovych had lost his legitimacy- but he refused to recognise the interim government that's taken its place.
As Cambridge University professor Marc Weller acknowledges, Russia is allowed to have a limited military presence in Crimea under the friendship agreement, but any action- whether in development or escalation, has to be done in consultation with Ukraine (as referred to in the 1997 agreement).
But as stated before, Putin doesn't recognise the interim government as legitimate. In his mind, radical minority groups ousted a democratically elected president and filled powerful posts with "crooks", who pose a threat to Ukranian Russians. Additionally under UN rules (Article 2(4)), until active military action takes place, the occupation doesn't constitute an armed attack (one which might necessitate the need for a military response). Chatham House's Ruma Mundal similarly lays out a grey area of international law- notably relating to authority. While acts of aggression certainly violate Article 2(4) and there isn't enough evidence to constitute a self-defence counterargument, from Putin's perspective he doesn't need to seek authority from Ukraine's interim parliament. Yanukovch might not have a future in Ukraine (Putin's words) but that doesn't remove his 'democratic legitimacy' when he writes a letter calling for Putin's help.
Final piece worth reading is Ashley Deeks' in The New Republic, which goes through the legal remits of self-defense and counter attacks in the event that Russia does declare war.
Should Britain Intervene? And why won't it?
One word: Money.
One of the most remarkable things that's happened over the past few weeks in the silence of Foreign Secretary William Hague. Speaking in the Commons last week, he said that there were no plans to impose economic sanctions, and that attending the G8 summit in Sochi was still on the cards. Other cabinet ministers have kept quiet on the Russia/Crimea front too, stating only that 'it was a very complex situation with many factors' (though I suppose with Libya it was just a cakewalk, right?)
Much of this decision has to do with the way the country's been structured since the 1980's- a time when former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher sang the banker's praises, revelled in the fruits of deregulation and unfettered foreign investment. It was a mentality that continued throughout the New Labour years- where London's luxury markets became similar to offshore tax havens. And throughout this period, London became more filled with management consultants, hedge fund managers and corporate lawyers, working in sectors linked to powerful oligarchs.
Which is why everyone knows Russian black money circulates the economy through London, but nothing is done about it. So despite the fact that targeted economic sanctions would be the best way to tame Putin, government mandarins have gone as far as to write up documents urging MPs not to close off the City.
Generally, the legal arguments are contentious- it's all about perspective: recognition of legitimate governance and what would constitute a breach of the Ukrainian constitution. It's worth noting too that Putin invoked the Right to Protect (R2P) principle too, drawing parallels with the US intervention in Kosovo to oust Milosoviec. In the game of diplomatic rhetoric, Putin's trying (and in my view, succeeding) at removing the West of any moral authority needed to stage a credible form of intervention.
Media Wars
As things change hour-to-hour, we've relied on the media to try make sense of what's going on.
The original media narrative in the West went a little something like this: Peaceful protests against Yanukoych's rejection of EU integration, led to physical, and now armed conflict. There are two sides; the 'Pro-EU' good guys, and the 'Pro-government (and therefore Putin)' bad guys. The latter have the evil Russia behind them, controlling the oil and natural gas supplies, while the good guys just have hope. It's tragic there's no US military presence, says ultimate good guy John Mccain.
So when Abby Martin and Liz Wahl, two Russia Today journalists, publicly resigned over Putin's actions in Ukraine, many took it as a sign of Putin's nearing defeat. Anchors from the UK and the US took the public resignations as a sign that Putin was losing his power- so much so that even the Kremlin-funded RT were turning against him.
But there is an over-arching theme to this; that the conflict in Ukraine is not just a revolt, or a military battle- but one fought over the internet and on television.
The media war is summed up quite nicely by Salon , though particularly in its charity to the accuracy of Russian reportage. Indeed, it's noted that while Putin certainly doesn't see the interim government as a legitimate or recognisable body on the diplomatic stage, he does publicly propose fresh elections in Ukraine, and sets out the precondition that Washington doesn't align itself with Ukraine's interim. There's a really interesting narrative taking place too; Considering the Nuland tapes (in which the assistant US secretary of state says "F the EU") set out a desired roadmap for Ukraine, it seems as if the US are trying to use the Ukraine crisis- and a stand off with Russia, to assert a strong foreign policy at a time when there isn't much faith in the Obama administration.
Of course, the media significance didn't really come about until anchor rebellion. RT wrote an interesting op-ed on these incidents, claiming that (1) perception of the conflict is culturally dependent and (2) that RT journalists have editorial independence and the right to their own opinions.
Whether that's true or not is up for debate (RT won't entertain the discussion, however) but it does show that news coverage is also verging into old cold-war style paradigms. Which is great for proprietors, though not necessarily the public.
Concluding Points
Which brings me back to where I started- noone really knows what's happening in Ukraine, which is probably why there's a lot less coverage now than a few weeks ago.
The Guardian's Simon Jenkins best sums up the current dilemma: The Western world has pronounced its moral indignation, but it's rife with double standards. Last years' Syria vote (remember, it was a vote on the principle of R2P) wasn't just about the Middle East, but the wider sea change of public attitudes to military action overseas.
So with the military option no longer valid, diplomats are taking over the debate with empty slogans along the lines of "Obama must show he's strong, Putin cannot be allowed to continue and NATO must act". All of these terms are contradictory, and don't fit into any coherent foreign policy response.
In the meantime, Obama is hosting Ukrainian PM Arseniy Yatsenyu in Washington (a move that is pretty much unprecedented), continued to threaten Russia with sanctions and slowdowns of natural gas production. Meanwhile, Russia continues to stock troops and artillery on the Crimean border, as the protectorate prepares for a referendum on joining Russia (something the US will refuse to acknowledge).
It's now expected that a mix of sanctions and over-reaching Russian ambition will make sure Putin kicks himself in the face, but while the move is certainly a gamble on the Kremlin's part, I wonder whether this prediction is more of a hope, than something that's necessarily calculated.
My prediction is that the West will reluctantly let Putin take Crimea, while they build relationships with a post- revolution Ukraine. Europe's dependence on Russian money, oil and gas are too great for any significant sanctions to effectively work, which of course will also direct US foreign policy objectives too. Meanwhile. unless the US starts exporting natural gas leverage will still be awarded to Russia- it's something that policy makers are urging, but considering the fastest that they can start distributing energy is in 2015, it might not be quick enough to stop Putin.
