'Fiscal Cliff' Crisis Is A Game Of Identity Politics

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While the Mayan prophecy may have not been fulfilled, at the stroke of midnight tonight- an event might just come close to such  insatiable wrath.

A failure to strike a deal on Fiscal Policy in the United States (going 'over' the cliff) has been characterised as an event with horrific consequences. Cuts in welfare and social security, potential rise in taxes for middle-class families- even the prospect of tipping back into recession (this time, about 100 times worse than 2008-9) have worked to conjure up images of filth, degradation and of course, the inevitable decline of civilisation. 'What happens if I starve because all the stores are closed?', 'How am I going to get to work in the morning?' , 'What if the fiscal cliff sends us to oblivion, where we become savages and throw poop at each other?'- These are just a sample of the reactions concerning the crisis.

The most interesting part of the  negotiations is that these  aren't simply economic questions, but rather, a kind of like a hangover of the 2012 election- essentially,  an exercise of identity politics. 

The current negotiations are basically playing out, as Professor Ian Robertson says here, a bit like a game theory model. Looking at it this way, the negotiations, there is an acknowledgement that both Republicans (R) and Democrats (D) have mutual interests- in this case, not going into recession, not upsetting the markets (great job, guys), not losing the credit rating, and not raising taxes on that all-important middle class.  But while there are mutual interests, the main difference lies in the Bush Tax Cuts. (D) wishes to extend some of the tax cuts, mainly on middle-income earners, (R) wishes to extend all of them.  You can see, in Jacob Geller's play-off matrix, (which has quite a good value-system) that a deal is likely to be brokered, with (D) gaining slightly more leverage than (R). But, this model assumes that the mutual interest being brokered is one that avoids the cliff- in essence, that in understanding the choices within the matrix, you have to account for the wider values of the collective goal of stability.

So, what if Professor Robertson's third point- about the psychological tendency for Schadenfreude, is the most prevalent component of the negotiations? In this case, would either Obama or the GOP prefer 'going over the cliff'?'. This posits a different type of matrix- one in which long-term political advantage plays a more important role than a mutual aim to balance the economy. Indeed, if safeguarding the economy was the priority to either party, then the bill signed in 2010 mandating the deficit reduction probably wouldn't have passed so hastily anyway. Political advantage is obviously much harder to quantify, but I would guess that in the post-election climate, the GOP will probably bear much more of the blame for negative externalities as shown here.  Obama and Biden are unlikely to budge on their position, probably due to a perceived post election mandate,  and their own comprimises relating to entitlements and the Bush tax cuts. Republicans might think they can repeat 2010-11 mid-term action, where they could hold the administration hostage until tax cuts would be accepted, but a stronger and more resilient Obama is probably going to be more confrontational. I haven't attempted to quantify this particular scenario, but my guess would be that even in this situation, the GOP would lose more by refusing to budge from their position. Further, they would be hurt significantly more in the the 2014 mid-terms by refusing to compromise on tax, social security and entitlements than Obama or the Democrats would from maintaining their position.

From what I can see at the moment, a deal is likely to be struct around the 11th hour. That's because the fiscal cliff is really much more about the GOP trying to reassert a political identity after it's defeat earlier this year. Even in this case, the GOP finds itself damaged by the ideological positions it took since 2008- bolstering in tea-party social conservatives, letting notions of the 'small state' overshadow wider ideas of the 'just' state, as well as marginalising the minority groups of which their ideal cuts would impact the most. Boenher knows this too, which is why he'll probably be inclined to allow the tax rises on the richest 10% as well as significant cuts to the defence industry. Unfortunately, the GOP misappropriated the political mood of the nation, sticking to the same ideological positions that lost them the election. What the speaker should realise, is that folding right now, might help his party's long road to recovery come 2016. 

Laws Alone Won't Curb India's Rape Culture

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After the brutal gang-rape of an Indian female student in Delhi, marking the 637th recorded case this year, India has been forced to confront the darkest elements of it's cultural history. Though little information that has been released, women across the subcontinent have organised in protest against an inherently misogynistic culture that has seemingly legitimised such actions, at the expense of their dignity. As more women have spoken out of their own experiences in the past few days, many of the protesters have encouraged the end of a passive culture of acceptance, in which females are systemically degraded and reduced as human beings.

Such horrific events might be viewed as uncharacteristic, particularly in a modernising metropolis, notorious for eulogising notions of love. Indeed, India's long-concealed history of gang-rape and molestation provides no better a juxtaposition to the bastions of romance exhibited by the Taj Mahal or the booming Bollywood industry. Yet, behind these romantic fantasies, exists over a century of culturally-induced sexual repression, affecting the most vulnerable in Indian society. Indeed, as the writer Arundhati Roy has noted, India's toxic rape culture does not simply expose the crudest forms of sexism, but, in turn, also reveals the cynical corruption of the apathetic political class.

Accusations of an institutionalised 'rape culture' is not novel. One only has to look at the unreformed 1860 penal code that views rape as an 'outraging' of a woman's modesty, an association that immediately affiliates the female body merely as a constituent within a masculine-dominated cultural system. Additionally, the law professor Upendra Baxi noted in 2002, that the legal and political systems of India limited the abilities of females to report sexual violence, and in turn reflected a political system in which collective sexual assaults on women could go unpunished. Baxi also highlighted that police authorities often neglected, if not participated in, the phenomenon of 'eve-teasing' - a crude form of sexual molestation that has more than quadrupled over the past decade. Indeed, despite the rapid economic prosperity India has enjoyed since it's independence, little has been achieved to in terms of effective protections for females.

Prime Minister Singh must realise that attempts to codify greater legal protections will benefit only a minority of women, most of whom are concentrated in affluent, urban environments with means to afford security. Despite the basic protections in place, there have been countless occasions where police officers have been accused of actively endorsing such activities.

Officers in New Delhi alone have stated on record, that "male agression is a natural instinct of sexual attraction" and possibly more mortifying, that young girls who share telephone numbers and dances with young boys, indicate legitimate consent. If law enforcement cannot understand the distinction between rape and consensual sex, or even empathise with the vulnerability of young females, then even the most intricate of legal systems will have little effect on rapists and molesters.

What must be realised, is that India should be proactive in challenging certain elements of traditional culture, if it truly wishes to succeed in securing the rights and liberties of its females. One of the most powerful messages held by a young protester this week read: "We live in a society that teaches women not to get raped, instead of teaching men not to rape". Simple as it may be, this statement truly reaches at the crux of this problem.

For the true injustice lies in how women are still recieved in Indian society. Despite phenomenal acheivements in education, professional and public life, women still find themselves devalued within archaic, patriarchal communities where family units unconditionally adore their sons.

Certainly, the denigration of females is often articulated in terms of sexuality, whereby the functions of females are seen merely in bearing and raising children. Further, the lack of sex education in public schools, combined with the staples of brutish masculinity and the fragile damsel within Bollywood cinema, are fundamental in defining gender relationships between males and females. Indeed, such misappropriated fantasies contribute significantly to both the devaluation of sexual relations, as well as fueling an insidious culture of victim-blame.

In justifying their actions, the rapists argued that it was necessary to punish the victim for deviating against societal expectations. In taking lessons from this, Indian autorities should realise that rape is a culturally imbedded problem. To truly defeat it, they must first work to reform the cultural dynamics of society itself.

Does faith have a role in the legal process?

I came across this  interesting article this morning. Legal philosophy is something I've been interested in for a while, as well as something that still tempts me to apply for graduate jobs at Law firms (an exercise that has thus far failed horrifically).

The article, written by the barrister Fatim Jumabhoy, looks at a specific case between two parties and a specific arbitration clause within a mutually consented contract. The legal problem alluded to, is one whereby a previously disregarded arbitration clause between the parties becomes a focal point within legal practice, and more importantly, questions relating to the relationship between individual parties and legal counsel; In this case, whether the parties have the legitimate right to discriminate against their arbiter on the grounds of religious conviction.

I'm not a lawyer, or a law student- so this blog post won't contain footnotes of specific cases, or an in-depth knowledge on the mechanics of legal practice (on a side note, I'm too broke to afford temporary access to law journals online...), so the basis of my thoughts are situated more on philosophical notions- ie. the nature of individual or communal recognition and it's  relationship with courts of law operating within democratic civil society.

Arbitration is a form of alternate dispute resolution (ADR) whereby a matter settled outside of court may take place through mediation with a specific arbiter. Arbitration is also a popular method of resolving disputes; for business, it is often faster than processes of litigation, as well as considerably more cheap. Complex matters can also be conducted much more easily, as parties themselves have a great deal more control over the process than within a court hearing.

One of the complexities in Jivraj v. Hashwani [2010] therefore lies in the acknowledgement of cultural preferences- ie. In desiring that the proceedings are undertaken by counsel with significant knowledge of their cultural community, an arbitration process conducted by 'specialists' is desirable.

Yet, I feel that a more profound legalistic problem also exists at this point, relating more significantly to the relationship between courts of law and complex multicultural society- one in which dominant theories of justice do not have the capacity to accommodate minority cultures with abstracted legal systems. Jumabhoy notes that the original agreement between the two parties stipulated that   :

"any disputes arising from their joint venture agreement should be subject to arbitration, and that the arbitrators should be ‘respected members of the Ismaili community and holders of high office within the community". 

Such a request is of course indicative that in the study of the  nature of individual rights, ownership, property etc. were to be  acknowledged by the arbiter within a specific system of assumed cultural relationships, distant from assertions of the common law system. In turn, the need for an Ismaili arbiter lay specifically in assuring that the both party's assertions of justice were met. This of course, raises a number of problems immediately. First, is the problem of secular courts recognising or indeed accommodating cultural demands deemed irregular- indeed, the Ismaili arbiter may have been able to recognise the cultural identities of each party in a way that a non-Ismaili representatives could not. For both modes of justice to work in conjunction, recognition and reconciliation of different notions of rights must be acknowledged. Second, lies more within the discourse between secular and faith-based forms of justice. In requesting an arbiter from a 'high position within the community' the Ismaili system of justice assumes that specific individuals with different qualifications (ie. a degree from a Hawza as opposed to certification from the English Law Society) assume just as much authority as representatives within secular courts. While an agreed consensus might be easy to reach within this specific case, when one extrapolates this idea to cases of marriage, divorce and family issues, assumed ideas of individual rights between both systems may be difficult to articulate. Indeed, as Ayelet Shachar has noted, many civil rights and Muslim feminist groups have argued that such assumptions often lead to significant disadvantages for women, minority groups and marginalised individuals.


The second problem highlighted in this case relates to the relationship between law and civil society, particularly in multicultural states. A popular notion is that the law operates as a binding framework that works govern society, setting out rules, rights and principles that are objective, and therefore beyond ethnic, cultural and religious contentions.  Indeed, one of the key conflicts in the High Court on this case, was a consideration of the role of the Arbiter being subject to specific employment legislation. While understanding the importance of independence in arbitration, the court noted that religious or national discrimination may be allowed if there was demonstration of a sufficient need. Thus, they ruled that in operating within a specific religious ethos, Jivraj did have a legitimate claim to the necessity of an Ismaili arbiter.

While the ruling was widely supported within the city, future problems have certainly been anticipated. In my opinion, the main problem lies in the balance in the distribution of fair justice, as well as the capacity for law to recognise and accommodate a vicarious range of traditional communities within the UK. For the latter, such acknowledgement comes at the price of questioning what claims for discrimination are legitimate (for example, whether it may be justified to rule out ethnic, sexual or gender groups) , and indeed, maintaining the universal rights held in the  EU Charter. In addition, I think there are some more interesting philosophical problems relating to Law as a consumer good- for example, in choosing forms of dispute resolution that take place outside the court, should parties have more ownership of the legal process? Does such ownership limit the realisation of the fairest possible outcome?

Overall, while I'd be inclined to agree with the court's decision, I expect a lot of these questions to emerge in the future, both within the courts of law and in Parliament.

My issue with Christmas (Or why Scrooge was right)

 

I've never been a huge fan of Christmas. Beyond the  dissolved religious value of the holiday (and if we were actually celebrating it, we'd be celebrating sometime in January, after a month of fasting), something about the holiday period still makes me despair for humanity.  Perhaps it's those last minute shoppers, barging through crowds of pedestrians to reach the zenith of Marks & Spencer to get the last coffee-maker on the shelf, which will only be used twice before its relegation to the storage cabinet. Or, it might be the ever elusive, abstract construction of the 'Christmas Spirit', a weird exertion of Marx's 'opiate' that  encourages a temporary therapy from material problems, through engaging with a material individualism. Certainly, it's genius is not in the resultant amnesia that the tyrannical spirit bequeaths on those that accept it, but how it has been constructed, branded and utilised within common discourse to encourage irrational purchasing.

Many people have commented on my reservations for Christmas, and I've had my fair amount of 'Scrooge!' accusations- or (more novel, I think) , 'Oh it's because you're Muslim, innit'. Much of this probably has to do with an acknowledgement that these types of national holidays should be exempt from post-modern tendencies of deconstruction; Probably the best modern example could be seen in those who criticised the celebration of the Queen's jubilee, or even the Royal wedding, only to find themselves marginalised by a collective sense of apathy. In other words, 'shut up and enjoy the company' seems to be the dominant mantra of stoical, modern, secular Britain today.

The second contention, is that the Christmas of the 'post-modern' undergoes a foundational transition along the same lines as society; ie. that the Christmas of a 'Godless' society transitions from one of ecclesiastical worship to tendencies more altruistic and communal. Christmas is about 'giving', 'sharing' and 'caring' and whatever other type of utopian verb one can conjure up from a seasonal advertisement from Sainsburys. But it is within this particular form of political economy, that allows the 'Christmas spirit' truly to truly thrive, constructing a temporary reality whereby the assumed individualist tendencies of society are forgotten. In this sense, the 'spirit' does not create, but rather induces an unreachable possibility of a world devoid of destructive selfishness.

There is of course, a peculiar irony behind such messages. In the past few years, collective social movements such as Occupy Wall Street, have helped to spark debates on the social role of corporations within the wider economy- particularly in terms of wages, labour rights and the nature of production. Furthermore, the movements have opened up wider concerns relating to social dependence on mass consumption, whereby products might be seen through the lens of Baudrillard; - situated within discursive systems of meaning and identity, and in so doing work to define social value.

The dark side of the 'post-modern' construction of Christmas therefore seems to lie within the flux of this transition. On the one hand, the holiday has been liberated from its religious monopoly, in turn signifying the the substantial power shift between Church and society over the past couple of decades. Yet, this has not necessarily created the reciprocal communality that non-religious advocates of Christmas have tend believe in. Rather, I'd argue that different relationships between advertisers and consumers have been forged, constituting more personalised contracts. In this case, consumers who purchase particular products also buy into the necessary altruist actions- ones which are required to fill those gaping emotional holes eclectically illustrated in seminal Christmas ads.

To me, Christmas posits an alternate realm in which the tyrannical Christmas spirit presents itself as  "emotional consumerism with a human face", by which I mean the actual act of purchasing and giving give products meaning themselves. If we consider that this manipulation is the inevitable product of the relationship between advertising companies and corporations, then altruistic meanings are not simply attributed to products, but also define the processes of exchange and communal gathering. Indeed, as a notorious advertisement suggests, "This is not just Christmas, this is an M&S Christmas".