And so the New Year is inaugurated with of the next phase in the 'era of intervention'. On January 14th, French president Francois Hollande iniated 'Operation Serval'- sending fighter jets to prevent Al-Qaida linked rebels who control the north of the country from siezing the capital, Bamako. News of France's intervention have inevitably brought up questions familiar to us; How long will French troops be stationed in Mali? Will Hollande's efforts rid the south of Islamist advance succeed? Most salient of all, will this be France's Afghanistan?
It was always likely that Mr.Hollande's decision to intervene would be met with accusations of 'neo-imperialism'. And while the legacies of Iraq, Afghanistan and even Libya are still pertinent, we should acknowledge that 'Operation Serval' actually occupies a far more complicated position than recuctionist paradigms we have become accustomed to in the discourse of 'intervention-politics'. Indeed, Hollande's operation cannot simply be reduced to one of humanitarian sympathies, or the overt intention of imposing liberal democracy. In contrast to his then presidential opponent Nicolas Sarkozy, Hollande had neither professed a faith in military intervention or the desire to extend French influence overseas.
Nor did Mali pose a territory of immediate strategic importance in Africa. While there does exist a supply of natural resources- particularly in gold, it does not hold such an abundant supply of fuel resources that military protection would be necessary for the survival of Western economies. Further, social, economic and environmental crises have long fragmented Mali, even beyond the Islamist-held North, where various cultures and communities function along ethnic and sectarian lines.
When acknowledging the inherent complexities within Mali, as well as the economic woes currently faced by the French, it might seem as if Mr.Hollande's decision may be the undoing of his presidency. That of course is too early to tell, but any claim of a 'second Algiers' or a repetition of Afghanistan should be considered carefully. For in reality, the resilience of Gaullist foriegn policy and the international responsibility would have rendered any president in the Elysee Palace little choice but to intervene.
For while the consolidation of 'militant islamism' within Western Africa has been cultivated since the 1990's, it is evident that the movement in Northern Mali became increasingly empowered after the fall of Gaddafi- an operation which the French led. For while Libya may have rid itself of dictatorial rule, the flow of arms and military training empowered various rebel groups linked to militant Islamist organisations- particularly the ethnic Tuarengs who defected from the Malian army and compose a significant porportion of the Malian population. This is not to say that the current crisis is due to the last Western intervention- contrary to some of the anti-war protesters in Paris. But it is true that a poor assesment of Libyan rebel groups, and an unclear post-war resolution did allow groups once in the shadows to attain significant political capital over the disarray. Although French officials may never directly say it, much of the decision to intervene is likely to lie in an assumed responsibility both to protect, and in atonement for past sins.
Intervention in Mali ultimately illustrates how the conduct of foreign policy in former colonies cannot be removed from the Gaullist principles of 'continuity and independence'. The formation of this 'special relationship' between the 'coloniser' and the 'colonised', pioneered by former president Charles de Gaulle in 1958, forms the cultural apparatus in which France maintains an historically-rooted moral duty to assist its colonies in the process of developing institutions to secure a true and lasting independence.
So it is perhaps the case that French intervention has occured not simply for humanitarian reasons, or to defeat tyrannical terrorists, but also in fulfilling a continued responsibility toward its former colonies' both in terms of securing common interests and providing a stable path of self determination .
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