A Problem With Evil : The Contributions of Gitta Sereny

Last Thursday, Gitta Sereny unfortunately passed away at the age of 91.

Sereny was a fantastic historian and journalist, noted for her bravery and fearless inquisition to the problems that still haunt us today- in particular, she was fascinated with the idea of evil, and it's place within the human condition itself. More importantly, I feel that Sereny is also a really interesting character. First, as a female historian she defied the cultural taboos of both academia and society. Second, she was also unafraid to challenge the social conventions which, I believe, still exist within our conciousness today- in that her works tended to illustrate an underlying sense of humanity in those that had carried out awful crimes. Rather than analysing behaviour within a simplistic paradigm of 'good and evil' (as can be seen very clearly with British tabloid newspapers), Sereny was fascinated with individuals, and what made them carry out such actions. As you probably expect, while she was praised by many admirers, those who thrive within the simplistic paradigm (cough, Daily Mail) criticised her work as providing the foundations of a 'culture' of victimhood. Regardless, I feel that her numerous studies- of Mary Bell, Albert Speer and in Britain, John Venables, provide a fascinating insight into our understanding of evil, as well as the nature of human beings. To commemorate her work, I felt that it might be interesting to place her findings in the context of contemporary moral discourse, and our understanding of  'evil' today.

It's important to note how Sereny was never really comfortable with the term 'evil'. For her, and other moral philosophers, the terminology was far too wide and contentious to be placed within any theoretical framework, nor to establish it's own concise definition. In fact, the problem of defining the notion of evil is still problematic in philosophical discourse. Paul Forsoma notes how evil can be framed in an axiological sense (ie. things or states that lack value or have disvalue, ie. famines and wars) or in a moral sense in relation to how we would define 'evil' actions that exist outside the possibilities of 'normal' wrongdoing. Furthermore, he notes the importance of distinguishing between the ideas of 'evil' and 'malevolence'. While source of the latter is 'ill will', taking actions that are designed to lead to "bad" outcomes, the idea of the former is still somewhat ambiguous. I believe that much of this ambiguity has to do with both contextual interpretations with evil, as well it's rational and irrational understandings. While I don't want to write an essay on the idea of evil (not only because it is impossible, but also because there are volumes of material on this very subject already), A great book is Lars Svendsen’s  "A Philosophy of Evil". In the book, he illustrates just how complex our perceptions oactually are- that while we may attribute these words to these particular actions, the motivations of such actions are dependent on the perceived outcomes. Essentially, the complexity highlighted relates to how the term is placed; while one may be capable of carrying out actions that may be deemed as evil, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an individual is inherently 'evil'.

Second, the traditions of interpretation should be considered, and here, I think Hannah Arendt's Banality of Evil provides quite a solid foundation in relation to Sereny's explorations. Arendt's analysis notes several important ideas; First are the differing 'modes' of evil, which cannot really be explained within traditional paradigms. Interestingly, Arendt's understanding of the concept stems from past traditions- most notably the Augustinian understanding- the position being that evil is the privation of good (stemming from Aristotle) and that a supreme, divine being is also good (Plato). In this case, evil can be seen as a product of external forces, and it is a matter of human will to overcome such forces (indeed, this is a rather simplified answer to Aquinas' 'problem of evil'). The Augustinian notion of evil is therefore objective in its nature,  which I believe Arendt extends by arguing that such objectivity can change, as the world also changes. Interestingly, in her analysis of evil in "Love and St.Augustine", she writes 'Since no part in this universe, no human life and no part of this life can posses autonomous significance, there can be no evil. There are only goods in their proper order, which merely seem evil from the transient perspective of the individual".  While it is difficult to suggest how much Arendt did believe in this, there are certainly similar underlining arguments in the 'banality of evil', in that she attributes the actions of Eichmann not to an ingrained sense of evil, but rather coherence within a state structure, that removed his ability to criticise the actions of both himself and the state.  So in this case, one may argue that the actions of evil (and possibly good) may also have much to do with the nature of institutions and structures within the state, rather than an internalised, individual phenomenon.

 
I think that this observation is important, if one places it in the context of both Arendt's and Sereny's experiences. Both had seen first hand the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich, and contrary to most accounts, both felt somewhat attached, if not enthralled with the regime. Arendt's observations in relation to the Augustinian tradition are important in that they are useful in explaining the influence of institutions in relation to evil. In a letter adressed to Karl Jasper on Kant's notion of 'radical evil', she says ;


"This happens as soon as all unpredictability- which, in human beings, is the equivalent of spontaneity- is eliminated. And all this in turn arises from- or, better, goes along with- the delusion of the omnipotence (not simply of the lust for power) of an individual man. If an individual man qua man were omnipotent, then there is in fact no reason why men in the plural should exist at all – just as in monotheism it is only God’s omnipotence that makes him one". 


While Arendt wrote little on 'radical evil' itself, her observations suggest that an individual evil- in fostering an artificial 'omnipotence' within a powerful, institutionalised structure serves to marginalise and reduce the self-actualization of other individuals within a given society (her example was the Nazi death camps). In this case, I suppose one could argue that the 'inherent' evil nature of humankind, as suggested by Kant's understanding of the Original Sin, is simply developed by Arendt, ie. The inherent evils are actualised, developed and distributed via institutions and contained organizational structures. Yet there is certainly a profound degree of complexity here, as evil actions cannot always be placed into Arendt's model of banality- effectively, that institutions are not a pre-requisite for carrying out immoral acts. Indeed, Kant also notes how the actions of 'evil' may also serve as a dialect between human faculties of reasoning and instinct. Further, while moral reasoning is supposed to serve to undermine 'anima instincts', in fact, immersion into society/culture- systems that cultivate individuals, may in fact be the diabolic dimensions that are heavily involved in the contemporary understandings of evil. In effect, although notions of 'evil' may be intrinsic with humanity, one may argue that in deeming certain actions 'evil' or 'not evil', external elements must also be considering within the composite framework.


How does this all fit into Sereny's work?  I think that Arendt, and other scholars of this very wide subject, have been profound in challenging general understandings of evil- one's that eradicate the humanity of those that commit atrocious acts. Interestingly as I finish this blogpost, the trial of Anders Brievik is reaching it's conclusion, and the debate between mad/bad still continues to rage. What Sereny's studies- of both Eichmann and Mary Bell show, is that evil is something that may be inherent within human kind, and certainly within all of us. While it is easy to mock/criticise someone over acts 'deemed' as atrocious by 'genuine moral standards' , we also forget just how much humanity was contained in such killers, and how their motivations were very much the opposite from what would usually be expected from "evil-doers". While I have not the time nor the alertness to go onto a lot of the other scholars of evil I wanted to talk about, I hope that this provides not only an insight into Sereny's work, but also assists us in answering some of the most compelling questions of today. While we are framed in a world perceived as a struggle between 'good' and 'evil', what both Sereny and Arendt show is that the notion is far more complex than one would imagine, and that all of us, may be capable at some point, at carrying out the actions of evil.