In Defence of Faith Schools

Writing in York Vision, Michael Cooper compellingly argues against the continuation of faith schooling. In his piece, he suggests that faith schools are detrimental to wider society on the basis that they actively promote an arbitrary form of discrimination, while also preventing the next generation of young people from integrating with their surrounding communities. In a time when divisions based on race and religion have become discomfortingly wider, this is certainly not an unreasonable proposition.

Are faith schools really such a menace to society? If you watched Richard Dawkins documentary (in which the aforementioned article takes most of its examples), then you might think so. And while I agree that Dawkins brings to light many problems with faith based education such as the lack of official accountability, its simplistic analysis largely reduces both the academic and social value that such institutions have.

Using a Muslim teacher’s lack of belief in evolution, one part of Dawkins’ documentary was carefully curated in a way that presented faith schools as centres of indoctrination, in which religious orthodoxy was placed before the ‘objective’ model of education taught at secular schools. Yet such theatricality similarly excersises ideology under the guise of education, positing the idea that schooling is simply a linear process- in which a teacher dumps ‘facts’ onto students, expected to absorb and later regurgitate it. Unfortunately, many schools across the country work like this. However, I’d argue that the large number of good faith schools acknowledge the diversity of opinion and views held by their pupils and wider society, so while teachers may hold their own opinions concerning issues like evolution or the ‘big bang theory’, they will also teach alternate views, whether from other faiths or derived by secular science. To teachers like Erfana Bora, this type of teaching not only allows for a larger breadth of knowledge, but also encourages a greater degree of acceptance, tolerance and lively debate which are supposedly absent in faith schools.

What of the accusations of religious indoctrination? I’d argue that rather than encouraging radicalization, separation or fundamentalism, faith schools are a useful institution in which such checks can be made. Here lies a fundamental difference between a standardized ‘faith school’ and the Saturday/Sunday religious schools that I attended during my childhood; while the latter requires no formal teacher training or adherence to a regulated curriculum, the former are often not subject to such lax monitoring. A report commissioned by the Institute of Public Policy Research (IPPR) in 2011 (pdf) indicated that the majority of Muslim religious schools had staff officially trained by teachers, performing to either a ‘good’ or ‘excellent’ standard, while also promoting inclusive, tolerant values. While some anomalies did exist, it indicates a need for deeper regulation and background checks, rather than a total denouncement and abolition of faith schools. Further, I’m sure we’d be far more comfortable with qualified and trusted Imams teaching the true tenants of Islam rather than other groups tied to more vicious, ideological agendas. After all, the radicalization of the Woolwich attackers or July 7th bombers were not linked to Islamic faith schools, but rather vigilante groups skilled in exploiting vulnerability. In this sense, abolishing faith schools will actually do little in tackling the societal rifts that supposedly precede such atrocities.

Finally, what about the accusation of child abuse? Both Dawkins and the philosopher A.C Grayling argue that forcing children into a system of education based on the beliefs of their parents is a form of coercion. As a secularist and humanist myself, I sympathise with this, in the belief that all young people require the space and intellectual development in order to reach their own conclusions in terms of belief. However, it should be noted that choice works both ways, and we reach a fairly contentious point in removing a parents’ right to choose what type of education is best for their child. Take this in other, non-religious contexts; would it be just as righteous to question a parent’s right to educate their children privately? What about home-schooling, or in institutions teaching in foreign languages? While some might argue that these models don’t lend themselves to ideological parameters, what they do indicate is the diversity by which parents are otherwise assumed to hold direct responsibility over the education of a child. In that case, don’t religious parents- who believe that religious education is the most likely route in which their children can lead happier lives, have both the right and responsibility to ensure this future for their child, despite the criticisms of secular observers?

While I commend Cooper for his insightful analysis, I can’t help but think that his overall argument is somewhat short sighted. While I certainly do not feel that religious schools are flawless, I do believe they contribute not only to wider society, but also to the array of choices parents may make when it comes to education. And if we are truly wary of ideology seeping into our education system, surely a uniform, one-for-all model of primary and secondary educational establishments is a far less desirable replacement.